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Abstract: Law and Economics has been attacked for ignoring distributional
concerns, despite that utilitarianism has strong redistributional implications.
Recently, the disregard of some scholars to distribution has been defended
with the claim that only the tax system aught to provide redistribution. This
essay challenges both claims. The utilitarian foundation of Law and
Economics does argue for redistribution. Moreover, the wastefulness of
redistributional rules is a truism, rather than an objection. Redistributional
rules cannot be rejected against the current suboptimal income tax, because
even if they wastefully deter work, the current tax may deter work more.
Redistributional rules can even be superior to optimal income taxation.
Redistributional rules can be superior because they can redistribute welfare,
rather than money, avoiding any tax disincentive; because they can induce the
revelation of skill and avoid the distortions of even an optimal income tax;
because they can improve the incentives of even an optimal tax by burdening
leisure activities and reducing the taxes' deterrence of work; and because
they may produce distortions that are synergistic with the redistributional
goal.
Several potentially advantageous redistributive rules are identified, such as
the right to abortion, emissions trading, bottle laws, the homeownership bias,
public housing, and excessive tort liability from accidents in leisure activities.
Their superiority to an equivalently redistributive, optimal, tax substitute is
shown. Law and Economic scholarship is uniquely poised to design such
rules, as several existing proposals show, such as the proposal for "blind"
political contributions, for random Lojack installations in high-crime
appliances, or for "shall-issue" firearm permits. Further proposals are
discussed: intellectual property fees, redistributive Coasean bargains, missed
pre-natal care vouchers, and school licenses for standardized scores.
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I. ISSUES OF DISTRIBUTION
Social welfare cannot be separated from questions of distribution.
Economic analysis, however, has been sharply criticized for ignoring
distributional issues. 1 This accusation is not meritless,2 although it is
outdated.3 Scores of research articles in Law and Economics ignore the
consequences of their analysis for distribution. This tendency is driven
1. A thorough discussion of the premises of law and economics and the use of the
theories of Coase to avoid concerns with the distribution of wealth, along with an attempt to
reclaim Coase for the Left is in Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment On Coase's The
Problem Of Social Cost: A View From The Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919. The point that law
and economics ignores distributional concerns is widely observed, id., passim (collecting
citations). See also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOCsTRA L. REv. 509 (1980). The explanation for why economic analysis of law ignores the
distributive effects relies on the power of the state to redistribute wealth. See A. MrrctEL
POUNSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10 (2d ed. 1989).
2. Two of the leading figures in law and economics, Professors Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell of Harvard Law School, explicitly defend the position that distributional
concerns should be delegated to tax analysis. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should
Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) [hereinafter Clarifying]; Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Redistributing]; Steven
Shavell, A Note of Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should
Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 414
(1981). They also argue that the law should not pursue goals other than increasing welfare.
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HtARV. L. REv. 961 (2001);
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the
Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000). Their thesis, however, allows (and
requires) the pursuit of redistribution if, and only if, it increases aggregate welfare, which is
consistent with the analysis of this article.
3. Several members of the younger generation of law and economics scholars-who
entered legal academia since, roughly, 1990-have explicitly taken the opposite position, and
have defended the pursuit of redistributive goals with non-tax rules. See, e.g., Mathew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Re-thinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 204-09 (1999)
(arguing that utility can be compared between persons, which leads to a validity of
distributional concerns); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1656 (1998) (herinafter Behavioral Economic Analysis]
(arguing that cognitive errors may indicate that distributional goals can be pursued more
effectively with non-tax legal rules rather than with tax rules). Some in the law and economics
community also argue that redistribution beyond that which maximizes aggregate welfare is
desirable. See Chris W. Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CoR .LL L. REv. 1003 (2001) (attempting to rebut Kaplow and Shavell and arguing for
redistribution); see also Ronen Avrahamn & Kyle D. Logue, Texas Versus Legal Rules:
Redistributing Optimally, available at http://papers.ssrn.com (last visited April 11, 2002).
280 [Vol. 33:279
SOLUTIONS TO DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
partly by a desire for analytical rigor that frowns on a detour outside the
immediate confines of the subject and partly due to the notion that questions
of distribution are the exclusive subject of taxation. Neither of these
explanations, however, constitutes an excuse that justifies this conduct,
particularly as Law and Economics holds a unique contribution to the
quandaries of redistribution.
The fact that equal increases of wealth have greater impact when added
to small, rather than large wealth, forms an argument for strong
redistribution. Redistribution, however, distorts productivity incentives.
Thus, we have an insoluble conflict regarding time-horizons. Redistribution
will cause an immediate boost, but may hamper further productivity. Since
from a long-term perspective productivity is paramount, the case for
redistribution becomes much weaker. The first two parts of this essay, Parts
I and IL, introduce this contradiction.
The next part engages the propriety of delegating distribution
exclusively to tax rules (Part IV). Concerns with distribution have been used
to attack Economic Analysis of Law for ignoring distributional
consequences. One response has been defensive, arguing that distributional
issues should only be addressed by tax policy.4 Despite the formal accuracy
of the statement that an optimal increment of taxation is preferable to a non-
tax rule that is equally redistributive but suboptimal, redistribution by non-
tax rules is often justified. Part IVA shows that even suboptimal
redistributive rules can be preferable to an incremental aggravation of
existing, sub-optimal, tax systems. Part IVB shows that redistributive rules
can be preferable to even an optimal tax if they deter leisure activities (Part
IVB1); if they do not induce a general, population-wide distortion of
incentives (Part 1VB2); if they operate on revealed skill, as might the
example of public housing (Part IVB3); and, most importantly, if they
redistribute welfare rather than funds, obviating thus the distortion of tax
(Part IVB4). Potential examples of such rules are legal abortion, bottle laws,
and the homeownership bias. Part IVB5 closes by observing that the features
of rules that directly redistribute welfare are not within the conventional
understanding of the function of taxation.
Rather than debating the desirability of redistribution that is obviously
desired, beneficial, and underprovided, economic analysis can propose and
has proposed methods for obtaining redistribution while bypassing the
distortion that monetary redistribution creates. Part V explores the potential
4. See supra note 2.
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of such concepts of "Coasean 5 redistribution," effectuated by means of
allocating rights, and of creating incentives that promote redistributive goals.
The contribution of this essay is the identification of several general
cases of desirable redistributive rules in Part TV, and the exploration of
further contributions by Economic Analysis of Law, through the
development of rules that circumvent monetary redistribution. Each such
redistributive rule puts one more cut in the Gordian knot of the conflict
between taxation and growth. Each such redistributive rule that Economic
Analysis may devise solves a piece of the contradiction that equality hurts
efficiency.
5. Note that I use "Coasean" while some write "Coasian." This is a linguistic issue that
depends on the root of the word. My view is that, just as Europe's residents are "European"
rather than "Europian," Coase's irrelevance should be Coasean (akin to Burkean and Lockean
theories). The answer should not depend on whether the root of the word "Coase" includes the
final -e. Although I do not see any argument that the -e is excluded, the word "Coasian"
cannot be the consequence of dropping that final -e. Even if the root of the word "Coase"
were "Coas-" then Coase's irrelevance would be "Coasan" rather than "Coasian." Think of
Tibet and Tibetans, or even Rome and Romans. One cannot object that Mars' imaginary
residents are Martians or that college students are collegians. The root of "Mars" comes from
the Latin genitive of the god of war: Mars, Martis. Similarly the root of "college" includes the
-i as it comes from the Latin collegium. For "Coasian" to be correct, its users should be able to
point to a word suggestive of a root with an -i ending, for example a Latin declination Coase,
Coasis, which I doubt. While natural users of a language have the license to make incremental
changes, I see no developing trend for converting the final -e of roots into an -i when deriving
other forms of the word. If anything, the continued use of "European" shows the persnickety
intransigence of roots even more than the use of "Martian" and "collegian," which trace back
to their merely Latin origin. The final -e of the root Europe- comes from the ancient Greek,
rather than the Latin "Europa." If "Europa" had supplanted the original root, it would have led
to Europe's resident's being "Europans." Therefore, this essay uses "Coasean." Practice seems
to agree more narrowly than expected; a search, on March 11, 2002, of the Westlaw database
of law review articles (JLR) for "Coasean" produces 555 articles, while a full 406 use
"Coasian" (28 articles use both without discussion, mostly because of the existence of both
versions in titles of cited articles). The difference seems discussed by only an article not
included in the above database. Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract
Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 237 n.* (1988) (adopting the "Coasean" form and
reporting that a LEXIS search produced 21-to-Il preference for "Coasean" in law review
articles). Although Professor Ronald Coase appears to use "Coasian" in THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND "ruE LAw 174 (1988), in a recent oral exchange with Professor Robert Lawless
he indicated that he assumed the usage would be "Coasean." E-mail from Robert Lawless to
Nicholas Georgakopoulos (April 5, 2002) (on file with author). This is fortunate, because if he
preferred "Coasian" he would need to change retroactively his name to "Coasi" rather than
argue that its root does not include the final -e. As the experience of the individuals formerly
known as Rod Stewart and Prince may indicate, changes of names may not have retroactive
effect.
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II. REDISTRIBUTE!
The importance of the distribution of wealth is not self-evident nor is it
contradictory to economic analysis. On the contrary, economic analysis has
shown its importance, which springs from the phenomenon of diminishing
marginal utility of wealth. This "diminishing marginal utility" is a feature of
the utility functions that reflects the reaction of each individual's utility or
happiness to changes in the world, in this case to changes of wealth.
Economic analysis does not abandon the subject of redistribution at that
point, but proceeds to justify freedom of contract and the freedom for
individuals to alienate their wealth and to benefit from exchanging it for the
products or services they provide. Economic analysis, however, must not
stop at the laissez-faire rejection of complete redistribution and forget its
importance for aggregate welfare.
Utility functions are constructed to capture or reflect individual tastes.
The usefulness of constructing utility functions is that they allow a more
precise analysis of choices. Although they have the defects of any attempt to
simplify a complex process, they are of profound use. They are, by design,
the constant but also unobservable guide of individual decisions. The utility
functions that are of interest here take a single input, wealth, and produce a
single output, utility. All other being equal, more wealth is better than less.
The way by which utility increases in response to increases of wealth, has a
notable feature that is captured by the notion of diminishing marginal utility
of wealth.
Diminishing marginal utility of wealth means that equal incremental
increases of wealth produce different and diminishing increments of welfare,
which is an accurate description of attitudes toward wealth.6 This leads to a
6. Risk aversion defines the shape of the function of utility of wealth. The coefficient
of risk aversion determines the curvature of the function, which is a solution to a differential
equation of the given type of risk aversion, most realistically, constant relative risk aversion.
Coefficients of risk aversion much above four are not considered realistic. See, e.g., Rajnish
Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 145
(1985). For some applications in legal issues and further citations, see, for example, Lawrence
Blume & Daniel Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 569, 587-88 (1984) (collecting citations in note 99); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos,
Frauds, Markets and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition of Justifiable Reliance
from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 MIAMI L. REv. 671, 693 n.36, 699 n.50 (1995) (showing
that risk aversion influences traders' capacity to correct prices); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos,
Meinhard v. Salmon and the Economics of Honor, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137, 161
(showing that risk aversion implies that broad fiduciary obligations are desirable).
2002]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
strong argument that redistribution of wealth would increase total welfare. 7
Giving to the poor tends to increase their welfare (or utility) more than the
reduction caused by withdrawing the same increment of wealth from the
rich. The strength of the argument about diminishing marginal utility of
wealth is visible in its graphical representation. The following graph depicts
wealth along the horizontal x-axis while the vertical y-axis represents utility,
welfare, happiness. The first few incremental increases of wealth, such as
the one from point W, to W2, produce large increases of welfare, such as the
one from U to U2. Equal increases of wealth being added to larger wealth,
such as the one from point W 3 to W4, lead to smaller increases of welfare,
from U3 to U4. This pattern continues, and further incremental increases of
wealth have an ever smaller effect on welfare.
7. This is not a novel proposition, dating from over 100 years ago. See F.Y.
Edgeworth, The Pure Theory of Progressive Taxation, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE 371, 373-74 (E.
Phelps ed., 1973).
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This figure depicts diminishing marginal utility of wealth. As wealth increases
along the x-axis, utility (welfare, or happiness) is given by the function UA(W)
and also increases. However, equal incremental changes of wealth have larger
impact when they occur under small wealth (such as the change from W, to W2)
than under large wealth (from W3 to W4, which produces a smaller increase in
utility). This is the diminishing effect of wealth on utility, which forms a strong
argument for redistribution. A second utility function is displayed with a dashing
line, UB(w), which is more sensitive to changes of wealth. According to the
objection that utility functions of different individuals are not identical,
redistribution may reduce the wealth of an individual who is sensitive to wealth,
such as the one whose utility is determined by UB(w). If redistribution reduces
this individual's wealth from W4 to a wealth of W3 so as to produce an increase
from wealth W, to wealth W2 in someone whose utility follows UA(W), it is
conceivable that this redistribution may not increase aggregate welfare. It is
takes from someone who is very sensitive to wealth and gives to one who is
nearly indifferent to wealth. The utility of the former would be reduced from U6
to U5 which may be more than the utility of the latter is increased, namely from
U1 to U2. The weaknesses of this objection to redistribution are discussed in the
text.
Some have objected that the argument for redistribution that is based on
the diminishing marginal utility of wealth is inaccurate because the
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increments of utility of different people cannot be compared. 8 Since
different individuals' utilities are unknown, diminishing marginal utility of
wealth only argues that aggregate welfare would increase if wealth were
redistributed among individuals whose utilities respond to wealth in
identical ways. Since individuals' happiness is strongly idiosyncratic,
redistribution may take from wealthy individuals amounts that contribute
more to their happiness than to that of the recipients of the redistribution. 9
While this objection is valid in theory, the pragmatism of its practical
application circumvents it easily. First, this objection is extremely unlikely
to be true in general because general redistribution takes from many wealth
to give to many poor. Although some avaricious wealthy may place very
high value on their last few dollars, it is virtually inconceivable that the last
$10wealth is on average enjoyed more by all wealthy than the same amount
would be enjoyed, on average, by the poor recipients of redistribution.
Moreover, although the objection would validly preclude complete
redistribution, it is not valid when leveled against the partial redistribution
that is desirable. To clarify this objection to redistribution, suppose that
enough redistribution has taken place that the rich half of the population is
richer than the poor half by two dollars. Taking one more dollar from the
rich half and giving it to the poor half would achieve complete
redistribution. This last piece of redistribution may well not increase
aggregate welfare, because this dollar is hardly certain to be more enjoyable
to the poorer half. When the two levels of wealth are so close it is likely so
easy to move from one to the other that the composition of the groups is a
matter of choice of effort rather than being a matter of skill or chance. The
8. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART &
BERNARD WILLAMS, UTILrrARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75 (1973); Mark Geistfeld,
Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters more than Money, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 114, 135-36 (2001); Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL.
463 (1979); see also UTLIrrTARANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds.,
1982) (collection of essays by leading proponents of differing views). A return to the notion
that utility can be aggregated, however, has at least one prominent supporter among
economists. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory
of Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. EON. 309, 317-
20 (1955); John C. Harsanyi, Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists
Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?, 6 THEORY & DECISION 311 (1975).
Some contemporary philosophers also seem to agree. See, e.g., R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING:
ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT (1981); J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian
Ethics, in SMART & WILLIAMS, supra, at 1.
9. The impossibility of comparing interpersonal utilities is also rebutted by Adler &
Posner, supra note 3, at 196, 204-09 (with further citations).
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choice to belong to the richer group is made by those who derive the most
utility from that additional margin of wealth and, therefore, taking from this
group is taking from individuals whose utility is more sensitive to wealth,
and giving to other group is giving to the group that is less sensitive to
wealth. Thus, the potential for different enjoyment of wealth among
individuals does rebut an attempt to use diminishing marginal utility of
wealth as an argument for complete redistribution. Complete redistribution
is undesirable on several other grounds, however, as shown below.
The same argument (that the wealthy may on average be so much more
sensitive to wealth that redistribution reduces aggregate welfare) is not
persuasive when leveled against partial redistribution. Some of the poor may
be very sensitive to wealth but unlucky or unskilled and some of the wealthy
may not be particularly sensitive to wealth but may be very skilled or lucky.
Accordingly, the membership in the two groups is mixed. When taking all
members of each group into account, although the wealthy group may have
some extra individuals of high sensitivity to wealth, it also contains some
who are relatively insensitive to wealth. Similarly, although the poor group
may have some extra individuals who are relatively insensitive to wealth, it
also contains some who are very sensitive to wealth. Even if the two groups
have somewhat different membership, the membership is not dominated by
sensitivity to wealth. Therefore, although some redistribution would be
taking from those who are sensitive to wealth and giving to the relatively
less sensitive and may reduce aggregate welfare, much redistribution takes
from those who have been lucky or skilled, and gives to those who have not
had luck and skill. Partial redistribution is still justified because it takes
increments from those of deep wealth, reducing utility relatively little on
average, and gives increments to those of small wealth, increasing utility
much, on average. Therefore, the inconclusive nature of close comparisons
of utility does not argue against redistribution that stops well short of
complete redistribution.
III. Do NOT REDISTRIBUTE!
With the same breath, however, economic analysis rushes to counter
these arguments. While redistributing wealth may increase total welfare,
much greater increases of welfare can be achieved by increasing
productivity. The evolution of human well-being over the last few hundred
years shows the inescapable truth of this. Human welfare has increased
much less from redistribution efforts, such as the French or Communist
revolutions, than by increases in productivity, such as the industrial
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revolution, mass transportation and communication, or the information
revolution. The effect of redistributing revolutions can even be argued to be
negative. 10  The economic explanation would be that they eroded
productivity incentives. The existing productivity incentives of the previous
system-in both France and Russia, a feudal system-were destroyed by these
redistributing revolutions, which were not able to produce a satisfactory new
web of incentives for advancing productivity. Redistributing existing wealth
may produce a one-time increase in welfare, but an erosion of productivity
incentives is a permanent handicap, the cumulative effect of which, over
decades and centuries, is massive.
The failure of the redistributing revolutions underscores the point that
the well being of humanity depends on production rather than capital. In the
most elementary terms, survival depends on the production of food, but even
in sophisticated societies, welfare depends on the production of goods and
services. Because humanity's immediate need is for products, rather than the
means that produce them, wealth as capital is a derivative of its product.
Capital has value only because of the product it generates; idle capital has
value only because of its potential to generate product if it becomes active.
Thus, the first problem with redistribution is that, to the extent it
redistributes capital or potential capital, it may influence productivity. The
other much more important and widely recognized problem is that
redistribution schemes interfere with the incentives for productivity.
Redistribution influences productivity incentives because it breaks the
connection between individuals' productive efforts and their welfare. A
complete redistribution would require the absence of private property and
equal distribution of all social products. We must compare the incentives
under these circumstances to incentives under systems where individuals
appropriate their own product or benefit from their productivity. 11
10. A string of statistical papers show the superiority of common law and of
Scandinavian legal systems over German and, more emphatically, French legal systems.
Although the authors attribute the differences to various details of business law, the
correlation with a past of redistributive revolutions is striking. See Simon H. Johnson et al.,
Tunnelling, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 22 (2000); Rafael LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael LaPorta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael LaPorta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
222 (1999).
11. My effort to avoid terms that refer to property concepts is as obvious as it is futile.
The difficulty of stating the idea of "benefit from effort" without using terms referring to
ownership and property is apparent and not at all coincidental. The acquisition of a property
right in the product of one's labor is a simple and nearly perfect incentive to produce. Many
societies, however, develop norms of sharing the appropriable product of an individual's
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Obviously, individuals whose product will be shared have incentives that
differ vastly from those of individuals who will enjoy exclusively the fruit of
their labor and whose enjoyment, therefore, is tied to their productivity.
Enjoying the fruit of one's labor makes the private welfare of each
individual depend on the value that each produces. Sharing the redistributed
product makes the private welfare of each individual depend on avoiding
personal effort and relying on the efforts of the other members of the
society. Thus, redistribution produces an incentive for every member of
society not to be productive. Even if some or many members do not succumb
to this incentive, others will and social product will be lost. The legal system
must address the incentives not of the noble-minded but of those with
comparatively more base motives, which echoes vividly in the views of the
Laws and Economics scholar Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes regarding the
"bad man's" law. Holmes considered that the law must be written and
interpreted from the perspective of the "bad man" because the law had to
thwart his efforts to circumvent it. 12 Similarly, the economic incentives that
the law gives must be viewed from the perspective of the "bad" or, rather,
self-interested and irresponsible persons, who would not voluntarily perform
their share of society's work. According to the Law and Economics view,
Holmes' warning can be written: The law must be designed for the
"irresponsible man."
In addition to distorting the productivity incentives of individuals,
redistribution may interfere with the productivity of capital. This problem is
a result of the redistribution of capital, rather than the redistribution of
product that caused the distortion of productivity incentives that was
analyzed above. Thus, it only arises when the social planner, persuaded that
redistribution of income is undesirable because it erodes incentives, inquires
into why the wealth that has already been accumulated should not be
redistributed, leaving future income to produce its incentives without
distortions. The simple objection can be that without a commitment that
such a redistribution will not happen often, individuals will react to the
labor, for example, the hunter's kill. The existence of such norms might be offered as a
counter example, but it is not. The individuals who share the appropriable fruit of their labor
are usually compensated with various tangible and intangible benefits. Evolutionary
anthropology delights in finding examples of such apparently altruistic conduct that gets very
tangible rewards. For an entertaining narrative of such "trades," see JARED M. DIAMOND, WHY
Is SEx FUN? THE EvOLUtnON OF HuMAN SEXUALrY (1st ed. 1998).
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897)
("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences.").
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possibility of occasional redistributions of wealth the same way as to the
redistribution of income. Even if wealth redistribution is rare enough-for
example, if it is only acceptable in the form of an estate tax-it has negative
consequences. It indirectly biases individuals toward consumption as
opposed to investment, and it directly distorts the allocation of resources
away from capital and toward consumption.
Individuals react to an anticipated redistribution of wealth by devaluing
income that capital assets will produce after the redistribution. Thus, capital
assets are less valuable to individuals than is the value of the capital asset to
society. When individuals decide whether to save by investing in a capital
asset or to consume, consumption will appear more appealing to an
individual than it is from the perspective of society. Society, of course, will
exist after the redistribution and value the income that invested capital
would have produced after that date. Sophisticated markets for capital assets
will mitigate this problem, because they may allow a sale of the assets
before the redistribution and consumption of the proceeds. Nevertheless, the
problem will persist for any assets that are not trading in a nearly perfect
market. Even in our environment of advanced markets, this exception clearly
includes family businesses. An example illustrates this distortion on
investment and the potential salutary effect of capital markets.
Imagine that society as a whole has determined that it would give up
consumption of 10 loaves this year in order to obtain 11 next year. Thus,
society considers 10% an adequate compensation to forego immediate
consumption and interest rates are at 10%. An entrepreneur has a business
which can be made more productive by an investment. The increase in
productivity is 11% of the invested amount. Thus, an entrepreneur with no
concern about enjoying any part of the future value of the business, would
make the investment. Not only is foregoing consumption justified by the
future gains, but our entrepreneur would also borrow at 10%, invest, and the
11% product would cover the interest and leave a profit. The investment, of
course, is also socially desirable, since society would give up consumption
for an 11% total gain, even if it were divided 10% to the provider of capital
and 1% to the entrepreneur.
Fear of wealth redistribution will prevent this socially desirable
investment. Suppose the entrepreneur will die this year and knows that his
heirs will pay a 10% tax on the value of the business. Now the investment is
no longer sensible for the entrepreneur's family. By foregoing consumption
of, say, 100 loaves, they would be able to make 11 more loaves every year,
which corresponds to an increase in the value of the business by 110 loaves
(the 11 loaves annually, capitalized at the 10% rate). They will not enjoy this
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increase in value, however. After the 10% tax on the increased value, they
will only net a value of 99. The same decision would be made if they tried to
borrow 100. The product of 11 would be more than sufficient to pay the
interest, but after the payment of the tax, the family cannot repay the loan. 13
Thus, redistribution distorts investment incentives and socially desirable
investments will not be made.
A market would induce the correct decision by the entrepreneur only if
full value could be had for the business. But if the buyers are to be induced
to buy, selling entrepreneurs will have to accept a discount. Full value in this
case would be 110 loaves, i.e., the value of the future production of 11
loaves annually, discounted at 10%. If the discounts and transaction costs of
the market imply that the entrepreneur will receive 10% less than full value,
the investment is still unattractive, because it requires an investment of 100
and can be sold, net of costs and discounts, for 99 (that is, 90% of 110).
Wealth redistribution also directly distorts the allocation of resources
away from capital into consumption. To the extent that it means taking from
the rich and giving to the poor, redistribution of wealth likely takes capital
and gives consumption. This is true because the wealthy who are being taxed
do not put their first but their last dollars into capital investment, while the
poor, who receive them, have a strong incentive or bias to consume them
rather than invest. 14
Interposing the state with a welfare system does not necessarily change
this problem. The state would still collect funds, a big part of which would
have gone into investment, and would turn those funds into immediate
consumption of health, retirement, or housing services. A different
description of this effect is that the state takes funds from users with low
discount rates-the rich for whom additional consumption today is of little
interest-and gives them to users with high discount rates-the poor who
would improve their lot immediately rather than take a chance on the future.
This is not to say that saving is inherently better than consumption; the
socially optimal compromise between saving and consuming must be made.
13. Of course, if this is a loan to the business or the entrepreneur, rather than a loan to
the family, the distortion does not arise. We are already, however, entering a situation of
sophisticated transacting. Not only does a norm of paying progenitors' debts likely exist, but
we are also ignoring the numerous costs of borrowing, such as the cost of entering into the
transaction and the increased risk of insolvency to which borrowing exposes the business.
14. Indeed, as if to avoid this problem, much redistribution is forced into investment, so
that the poor are given education rather than funds with the option to either spend them on
education or in consumption. This also confounds statistical attempts to measure the impact of
taxes and redistribution discussed below, infra note 62.
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The hypothetical estate tax creates a bias in favor of consuming, which
arguably wastes socially desirable investment opportunities. 15 Nevertheless,
this argument should not be understood to consider the estate tax as
undesirable. 16
One might counter that redistribution does not influence incentives
because the acquisition of wealth is random. 17 If the acquisition of wealth
were a truly random lottery, redistribution would simply reverse the results
of the lottery with no effect on incentives. Wealth creation, of course, is not
truly random as it also depends on many other factors such as effort,
ambition, and skill. Under the lottery scheme, the tax rate should be
15. Perhaps one could argue that the state's welfare system would not produce this bias
if it were structured akin to a defined contribution retirement plan, but this is impossible.
Defined contribution plans contrast with defined benefit plans, in which the benefit that
individuals receive does not depend on the accumulation of their savings. A defined
contribution plan, by contrast, means that benefits are solely the product of savings that have
accumulated. This concept, however, does not lend itself to applications outside the retirement
setting. In what sense can the young welfare recipient have saved so that the redistribution
received is the product of some contribution? This redistribution should more appropriately be
considered an insurance scheme, where all pay a premium to avoid the dire situation, and the
welfare recipient is simply the unlucky one who receives the insurance payment. Insurance,
however, causes distortions of its own. In the setting of a plush welfare scheme, a concern is
that it mitigates the incentive to avoid welfare. Contractual insurance tries to avoid this "moral
hazard" problem in various ways, including only compensating accidental harms as opposed
to intentional self harm, a concept that is again hard to apply to welfare unless one were to
make welfare inversely related to skill, a proposal that will also fail.
16. This discussion should not be read to imply that the estate tax is particularly
unappealing, because the estate tax may have advantages compared to other types of taxation.
The advantages become obvious if we focus on the inheriting generation. To the extent the tax
creates a bias in favor of spending and donating wealth to charitable causes, it reduces heirs'
dependence on inherited wealth and creates incentives for the heirs' productivity. Moreover, if
we are inherently overoptimistic-as psychological studies of cognitive biases show-then this
is the tax least likely to influence incentives. All taxes create biases, but a tax that people
expect to pay later than they actually do would distort incentives the least. A similar argument
has been used to attack the notion that redistribution should only be pursued by the tax
system. To the extent that uncertain events are underestimated, redistributing wealth by means
of legal rules that apply rarely, perhaps such as tort liability, will have less of a distortion on
incentives than a tax, which applies with certainty. See Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis,
supra note 3, at 1656.
17. A comprehensive survey of the theories that produce unequal wealth also discusses
the possibility of randomness (called the "Stochastic Model" of wealth) and finds that they are
refuted by the evidence. See Gian Singh Sahota, Theories of Personal Income Distribution: A
Survey, 16 J. ECON. Lrr. 1, 8 (1978) ("In one of the most comprehensive tests of stochastic
theories. . . finds significant evidence against practically all the major assumptions of these
models.").
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inversely related to the deterministic contributors to wealth creation such as
effort, and skill, so that the one who exerted greater effort, and skill of two
equally rich individuals, should be taxed less. 18 Nevertheless, a socially
undesirable bias would still exist. Some activities involve highly risky and
uncertain rewards and such a policy would deter them. Take oil exploration
or filmmaking. The rewards from the activity are so unpredictable that it can
be analogized to a lottery in which winning is weakly related to skill or
ambition. Entrepreneurs search for oil only because they could benefit from
"winning the lottery." A redistribution scheme that takes the gains away for
not being the product of skill, ignores that entrepreneurship and the creation
of value is also a matter of taking chances. If society does not let the winner
keep chance's reward, society will be missing chances for gains. 19
18. This concept would also preclude actual lotteries, betting, and games of chance.
Note that the determinants of wealth creation in the sentence of the text do not include
ambition, which has an ambivalent reception in the tax literature, which seems to suggest that
wealth created by ambition but without effort and skill should also be taxed more heavily.
Unless ambition is considered an affirmatively undesirable motive, the analysis of the taxation
of wealth accumulations due to luck that follows in the text, will also apply to the taxation of
wealth accumulations due to ambition.
19. Entrepreneurial risk-taking and wealth accumulation as a consequence of chance are
identical concepts. For example, one cannot argue that gains from entrepreneurial risk-taking
should be taxed more because every individual who was exposed to the same risk would enjoy
the same reward. As a matter of probability, out of the numerous risk-takers, only the lucky
ones enjoy the rewards. If the reward occurs with 10% probability, for example, this implies
that only one out of every ten risk-takers will enjoy the reward. Neither does conditioning the
answer on a choice to accept to risk change the issue. Answering that the entrepreneurs who
chose to take the risk should still be entitled to the reward, does not negate probability theory,
for not every uncertainty is consciously accepted. For example, if accidental good luck, such
as the discovery of penicillin while conducting other chemical experiments were taxed, then
conducting chemical experiments would be deterred. If conducting chemical experiments
tends to induce uncertainty-bad bums, for example, as well as valuable discoveries-such a
tax would deter chemical experiments and the associated but remote gains of society.
Conversely, compensating the bums would overly encourage an activity that may be
undesirable on an expected value perspective. For attempts to adjust for luck, see generally,
Donna M. Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 NEB. L. REV. 700, 724 (1999)
("Differences in ... willingness to take risks result in differences in accumulation, but these
differences are acceptable because they result purely from individual choice; everyone could
accumulate as much as the person who accumulates the most, if they were willing to expend
the effort or make the same sacrifices." (emphasis added)); Donna M. Byrne, Progressive
Taxation Revisited, 37 ARiz. L. REv. 739, 779-81 (1995); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?
Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292-96 (1981) (distinguishing
chosen uncertainty, labeling it "option luck" and allowing it to run its course, from unchosen
uncertainty, labeling it "brute bad luck" and requiring rectification of its losses; not
mentioning "brute good luck");
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The conflict between the idea that redistribution increases welfare and
the realization that it also destroys productivity is stark and insoluble. It may
be an inescapable conflict of organized society, although this essay argues
that the legal system can improve this compromise. The unavoidable
potential for different compromises between redistribution and productivity
in different jurisdictions, produces further distortions. Jurisdictions that
favor productivity will also receive the indirect benefit of attracting the most
able and risk-tolerant individuals from jurisdictions that favor redistribution.
This, of course, produces a collective action problem among jurisdictions
that compete, in essence, for members with skill, energy, and risk-bearing
capacity. Individual jurisdictions choose less redistribution than they would,
because they seek to avoid the flight of talent and risk-taking ability to
others. An interesting partial remedy of this bias is to make contributions to
international organizations inversely related to countries' taxation levels.
Countries that tax less are recipients of "brain drain"-the other countries'
skilled, or risk-tolerant-and have greater productivity at the expense of
countries that favor redistribution. The greater payments can partly
compensate for this bias.20
IV. DELEGATING REDISTRIBUTION TO TAX POLICY
Once redistribution is accepted, be it as little or as much as each
jurisdiction chooses to provide when compromising between future and
current welfare, the question becomes how the legal system should provide
it. This is an issue that has haunted Law and Economics analysis because the
orthodox approach to Law and Economics analysis disregards the
distributional consequences of rules. As a result, Law and Economics has
been attacked for ignoring redistribution issues.21 One response has been
that concerns about distribution should be addressed exclusively in the tax
system.
Law and Economics scholars with a laissez-faireist streak have argued
that taxation should be the exclusive means for redistributing wealth. 22 The
20. For an attempt to improve distribution of wealth on a world-wide level, see Michael
J. Graetz, International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policies. 54 TAx L. REv. 261 (2001), and 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357 (2001).
International tax competition is not seen as a competition for individuals but for investments.
See, e.g., Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 Gao. L.J. 543 (2001).
21. See supra note 1.
22. See Kaplow & Shavell, Clarifying, supra note 2; Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing,
supra note 2; Shavell, supra note 2.
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foundation of the thesis is that using non-tax law to redistribute wealth
distorts the operation of the markets. Therefore, redistribution by means of
non-tax law reduces welfare. The conclusion is that redistribution, barring
exceptional circumstances, should occur through taxation. This reasoning,
despite being technically correct, is substantively false in at least two ways:
First, actual taxation has large distortionary effects, making the premise
false. Second, even the distortionary effects of an optimal tax outweigh the
distortions of several kinds of non-tax redistribution.
The model that is offered as proof of the superiority of redistributing
through the tax system is very simple. Suppose that an optimal substantive
(non-tax) rule exists, but an inferior one may provide some additional
redistribution. Compare the adoption of the redistributing rule to maintaining
the optimal rule while using the tax system to achieve the same
redistribution while producing the least possible distortions on incentives.
We are told that the latter alternative is superior. Due to the efficient rule
and the minimized distortive tax, society is better off than under a
suboptimal rule and non-minimized distortions of taxation.
It should be obvious that this thesis is a truism. Tax is assumed to
produce distortions equal to those of the redistributive effect of the non-tax
rule.23 A more accurate model should acknowledge that the additional tax
23. For example, Kaplow & Shavell posit:
suppose that high-income individuals are subject to an income tax of 30 percent and
that, in principle, further redistribution to the poor would be desirable. Would we
want to adopt an inefficient legal rule because it redistributes an additional 1 percent
of high earners' income to the poor? Under such a regime, high-earning individuals
would surrender 31 percent of each additional dollar of income: 30 percent would go
to the tax authority, and I percent would be taken by the legal system. Now assume,
instead, that an efficient legal rule is retained and the income tax rate for high earners
is raised to 31 percent. Then they would be in the same position and would be
induced to work the same amount as under the inefficient regime. (The increase in the
tax rate from 30 to 31 percent does not reduce their incentive to work because it is
offset by the 1 percent decrease in the implicit tax that was associated with the
inefficient legal rule.)
Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2, at 667. Note however that this hypothetical
establishes a comparison between equal distortions. Both the tax and the non-tax
redistribution are achieved by a 1% increase in the marginal tax rate. Hence, they both have
the same consequence for incentives and both distort the choice between work and leisure the
same way. Several non-tax rules examined in Parts IV and V achieve redistribution without
being equivalent to a tax increase, hence, without distorting the choice for work versus leisure.
A different attack on the Shavell side's model rests on the notion that neither inefficiency
nor redistribution are obtained in discrete intervals. Suppose we had the optimal rule and
tweaked it very slightly-infinitesimally-in favor of more redistribution. If redistribution is
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may cause greater distortions than the non-tax rule, particularly as long as
taxation takes the wasteful shape of increasing marginal tax rates. An
increase of an inefficiently designed tax burden should be considered likely
to induce a greater distortion than any distortion caused by the redistributive
rule. Then, the comparison is of two different compromises between wealth
and redistribution. Using the optimal non-tax rule with a more distortionary
tax regime to redistribute wealth must be compared to using a less
distortionary, but redistributive rule, with a less distortionary tax system.
The conclusion is that either compromise may be superior.
A graphical representation of this dispute helps resolve the different
claims. The graph would have two dimensions. One would be redistribution
and the other would be the substantive function of the non-tax rule at
issue.24 In the example of torts, the metric may be the total cost of accidents,
namely the cost of care to avoid accidents plus the cost of injuries from
accidents that do occur. The optimal tort rule minimizes total accident costs,
and the dispute is whether a tort rule that redistributes some more is
preferable to a combination of the optimal tort rule and some more taxation
as to produce the same amount of additional redistribution.
The graph that proponents of redistribution-by-non-tax-rules (the
opponents of the Shavell position) envision has a peak at some point where
accident costs are the smallest and only the inherent redistribution is
provided by the rule. The graph has three dimensions but is presented as we
look "down" so that the third dimension is not visible. The dimension that is
not visible is the social welfare that the rule produces and we can think of it
as the "altitude" of a "mountainous" surface. The two visible dimensions are
accident costs and redistribution. Accident costs reach a minimum at the
desirable, the new rule is likely superior. Chris W. Sanchirico, Should Legal Rules Be Used to
Redistribute Wealth? Taxes Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable
View, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 797 (2000); see also Sanchirico, supra note 3. Maximization,
however, means that even an incremental move away from the optimal does reduce welfare, as
Shavell's side explains. Kaplow & Shavell, Clarifying, supra note 2. Furthermore, some of
the existing and proposed redistributive rules that do not distort incentives which are
discussed in Parts IV and V, however, do not fit this mold of incremental improvements. They
consist of improvements in distribution that cannot be imposed in arbitrarily small amounts
along a continuum. Rather than being desired improvements of other rules, they are
independent redistributive rules. The bottle laws that clean inner-city neighborhoods and the
availability of abortion that preserves the educational opportunities of the less skilled
teenagers are typical examples of improvements that are not incremental.
24. Thus, the figure makes a simplifying assumption that the rule has only one goal or
aggregates all its goals into one metric; if the rule had more goals, they could be included but
a graphical representation would be impossible.
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optimal tort rule, which is also associated with some amount of
redistribution. This is represented by point A.






This is a graphical representation of the disagreement regarding whether only tax
rules should redistribute wealth. Redistribution is represented on the horizontal
axis and the avoidance of accident costs on the vertical. The optimal tort rule
that produces the best outcome regarding accident cost avoidance also provides
some redistribution that is represented by point A. The curve is the frontier of
redistribution and accident cost avoidance that variations in the tort regime can
provide. Proponents of redistribution would argue that increasing redistribution
by changing the tort rule would increase welfare, even if it gave up some of the
avoided accident costs. This would move us to point B, which, they would argue,
may correspond to greater social welfare than the point A. Those who favor
redistribution by means of the tax rules only, would counterargue that if B
produces more social welfare than A, then C produces even more and is feasible.
Point C corresponds to the optimal tort rule (the one that produced A) with some
additional redistribution achieved by means of the tax system. The problem with
this argument is that greater taxation may distort markets and reduce welfare, so
that C would not correspond to more social welfare than B. Points A and B
should be on the "cost-avoidance and redistribution frontier" but are drawn
slightly inside it for clarity.
The opponents of the Shavell position would now have us move to a
slightly more redistributional tort rule, which would be suboptimal in terms
of accident costs. By obtaining redistribution, this new position, although it
produces more accident costs, is superior because of the additional
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redistribution it provides. In the graph, they would argue that if A
corresponds to the optimal tort rule that minimizes accident costs, then point
B, which is associated with greater accident costs, provides society with
more welfare because it corresponds to more redistribution. Point B, in other
words, is higher in total welfare terms than A.
The side of Shavell argues that point B is dominated, for two reasons. If
total accident costs are greater, society's total welfare is reduced. No matter
how this welfare is distributed, it cannot produce more welfare than
redistributing the maximum wealth, which exists when accident costs are
minimized. In other words, either welfare generated by redistribution cannot
compensate for wealth lost to increased accident costs, or redistribution from
reduced accident costs always produces more welfare than redistribution
with greater accident costs.
The first view holds that point B is always lower (in terms of social
welfare) than point A. Such a view is untenable if we believe redistribution
increases welfare. Redistribution may well increase social welfare by more
than the loss in terms of accident costs.
The second view holds that a third point exists, point C, where
redistribution is performed by tax while using the optimal non-tax rule, and
that point C is necessarily higher in total welfare terms than B. Because
point C corresponds to the same lowest possible accident costs as A, it has
the same coordinate along the accident-cost axis. Because it entails more
redistribution, it has a greater coordinate on the redistribution axis. In other
words, regardless where point B is, point C is necessarily higher. This is
correct if the tax system is the least costly mechanism of redistribution. A
recent estimate of the cost of the distortion due to the income tax is $2.65
per dollar raised. 25 The idea that the costs of taxation must be taken into
account when deciding its level is part of the conventional understanding of
the economics of taxation, the seminal work being that of Pigou and dating
from 1938.26 Just as different taxes produce different consequences in terms
of distortions, different means of redistribution do too.
The side of Shavell explains that the distortion of the tax system is a
distortion due to redistribution and any redistributive scheme will have the
same distortion. In other words, whatever the relationship between point B
and point A, point B cannot be higher than C. Point B cannot be higher than
C because B involves the same distortions due to redistribution and starts
25. See Martin S. Feldstein, How Big Should Government Be?, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 197
(1997).
26. A.C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANcE (1928).
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from a lower (suboptimal) level of the cost of accidents. 27 This is known as
the double-distortion argument.28 An optimal rule will cause no distortions,
but a tax, even if optimal, will distort incentives to work. A suboptimal
redistributive rule causes a distortion by virtue of not being optimal, and a
second distortion by a reaction identical to the tax.
For example, consider that a society consists of two individuals, a
productive one (the skilled) who has high income and a less productive one
(the klutz) with lower income. An income tax reduces productivity by
inducing the more productive one to work less. Suppose the skilled makes
twenty loaves each week and the klutz only makes five loaves.
An income tax rule can redistribute without interfering with the baking
process, but it will deter work. Impose an income tax of 60% on the number
of loaves over ten. If the skilled still produces twenty loaves, the income tax
will take six and give them to the klutz. The klutz adds the six loaves to the
five he makes and enjoys eleven, while the skilled enjoys fourteen. We need
to treat the skilled as a self-interested person, however. Without the tax, the
skilled enjoyed the last one of the twenty loaves barely enough to keep
working. When the tax is imposed, the skilled knows he will not enjoy that
entire loaf, and he prefers to rest or play. Whether the skilled will quit two,
four, or six loaves before he would without the tax, we cannot know.
Suppose that the skilled chooses to make fifteen loaves, giving three to the
tax (60% * 5 = 3) but still enjoying twelve. The skilled has twelve loaves
and a lot of rest, while the klutz has eight. The two together have fewer
loaves than without the tax, but the distribution of loaves is more egalitarian,
since the skilled has only four loaves more than the klutz. Despite that the
reaction of the skilled to the tax is so petty and wasteful, this result is better
than a wasteful redistributive rule.
Consider, first, a desirable rule. Suppose both bakers sleepwalk once
every week, entering the other's bakery and, unwittingly, enjoying an early
morning snack at the other's expense. The cost of this event is that the
victim, weak without breakfast, makes two loaves less. The rule entitles
27. See Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2.
28. See, e.g., Sanchirico, supra note 3, at 1014. Sanchirico (as do Logue & Avraham,
supra note 3) argues that redistribution based on features or manifestations of skill and well-
being other than income will not produce the double distortion. If non-clumsiness is such a
feature, adjusting tort damages downward, it is argued, would not induce avoidance of work
and income. Indeed it would not, but the skilled and well-off would have an incentive to
distort their image toward clumsiness--take more risks and engage in more activity not just to
take advantage of the lower cost of accidents, but also in order to appear clumsy. Hence, the
proposal produces a new double distortion. It distorts not only the activity, such as care, but
also the manifestation on which redistribution is based, such as the appearance of clumsiness.
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victims to get the breakfast that the other was baking. When the rule is
imposed, the total loaves go up from sixteen back to twenty. Instead of a tax,
now, tweak this optimal rule to get some redistribution out of it while
reducing its efficiency. In addition to getting the other's breakfast, have the
victim use the other's bakery for a day. The bakery of the klutz is a mess, the
skilled does not benefit from the new rule, stays in his bakery, so the new
rule costs nothing to the klutz. The bakery of the skilled is in perfect order
each morning, ready to make four loaves. The klutz makes four loaves and
keeps them, leaving the bakery a mess, and not capable of producing four
loaves the next day. The tweaked rule has some waste. The skilled, petty that
he is, responds to the potential daily loss the same way as to an income tax.
The skilled leaves work earlier, and leaves the bakery slightly messy,
making only three loaves each day instead of four. The weekly production of
the skilled is not quite fifteen, because the mess the klutz leaves prevents the
skilled from making three loaves; suppose he only makes one loaf, instead of
three. The skilled makes thirteen loaves each week, five lost to the
redistributive effect of the rule, and two lost to the inefficiency that the rule
imposes. When the desirable rule is tweaked to provide redistribution, the
skilled ends each week with ten loaves, thirteen that he made minus three
that he paid for sleepwalking. The klutz ends up with eight loaves, five that
he made and three that he got from the skilled. The result looks appealing
from a redistributional perspective, perhaps superior to the tax, as the klutz
has only three less than the skilled. Nevertheless, a tax would do better,
argues the Shavell side. A tax would not produce the inefficiency of the loss
of two loaves. Returning to the optimal sleepwalking rule and increasing the
tax to 75% would further induce the skilled to cut back, and make, say,
fourteen loaves. After giving three to the klutz, they have eleven and eight.
The klutz has the same, and the skilled has one more. Although the tax chills
the incentives of the skilled to work, it does not impose the inefficiency of
the tweaked rule. The tax imposes one distortion while the tweaked rule
imposes two. The tweaked rule is not superior to the optimal rule coupled
with an additional increment of income tax that produces the same
redistribution.
Based on this reasoning, Shavell's side argues that tweaked rules are not
superior to optimal rules coupled with an additional increment of optimal
income tax, although they allow that in exceptional cases they may be. This
statement, however, is a truism since it essentially states that optimal rules
plus the least possible reduction of the incentive to work is better than
suboptimal rules plus an equal or greater reduction of the incentive to work.
Akin to other truisms, it is useless, because the existing income tax is not
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optimal. Even wasteful tweaked rules can be desirable when compared with
a suboptimal tax. Moreover, the exceptional cases are quite frequent.
Frequently, redistributive rules are preferable to an equally redistributive
program even if it were funded by an optimal increment of income tax.
A. Desirability Under Sub-Optimal Taxation
Income tax can be less than optimal in the reduction of work that it
induces. Income taxes can be different in the schedules of tax rates that they
impose. As income taxes deter work, different income tax schemes, applied
to the same population, will induce different amounts of work and product.
Naturally, smaller taxes will tend to deter work less than large taxes. The
pursuit of the notion of an optimal tax, however, keeps -constant the total
revenues raised by the tax. Two different income tax schemes, that raise the
same revenue, are compared by examining the total product of all taxpayers.
The income tax that reduces incentives for work the least, will have the
greater product, and would be preferred. Thus, that an income tax is optimal
means that no other schedule of tax rates exists that deters work less than the
optimal tax. Those who study optimal taxation agree that existing tax
schemes are not optimal.29
The defectiveness of existing tax schemes falsifies the thesis of the
Shavell side, not in theory, but in practice. The defects of the existing tax
scheme indicate that redistribution that rules provide cannot be compared to
the ideal of a tax that deters work the least. The redistribution that rules
provide will tend to deter work, since the rich lose some benefit from
working. The substitute of this redistribution, however, will not be the ideal
of the optimal tax. Society's alternative, in practice, is a haphazard tax
system, which can be improved and the redistributive rule may constitute an
improvement. The redistributive rule may well allow the reduction of tax
rates. The reduction of tax rates that are not optimal implies that incentives
for work are restored. The restored incentives would be by definition
stronger than an equivalent reduction of an optimal tax. The redistributive
rule will substitute its own redistributive scheme, which will deter work.
Even if the redistributive rule deters work more than an optimal tax, the
result can be superior to the alternative. Although the redistributive rule
29. A very readable introduction to optimal tax theory is offered by Lawrence Zelenak
& Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX
L. REV. 51 (1999). See also STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX PoLIcY 236-45 (1993); Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1959 n.219 (1987) (noting the assumptions of optimal tax literature).
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deters work, the reduction of tax rates reinstates incentive to work. Since the
tax is not optimal, the reinstated incentives to work may outweigh the
deterrence of work due to the redistribution of the rule.
To see this effect in the example with the bakers, we would need to add
a third baker, average. The tax would deter the work of the average and the
skilled (while an optimal tax would not deter the work of the most
productive individual in society by imposing no tax on his last increment of
income). 30 Without the redistributive rule, the tax would have to be large
and both the average and the skilled would reduce significantly the number
of loaves they would make. Adopting the redistributive rule, wasteful as it
may be, could be a gain. The tax could be eliminated (or just reduced) and
the deterrence of work due to the redistributive rule could be less than under
the tax.
Suppose that the average baker can produce twelve loaves, leaving the
capacity of the skilled and the klutz the same as in the previous example.
Start with a suboptimal income tax of 50% of the loaves over eight, to which
the average responds by cutting back to ten and the skilled by cutting back to
fourteen. The tax takes one loaf from the average and three from the skilled.
Giving these four loaves to the klutz, who makes five, brings him up to nine
loaves. Consider as an alternative a suboptimal rule that imposes
redistribution that deters work less. The rule is that whoever makes more
than ten loaves must submit to an inspection by the klutz. The klutz inspects
by "tasting" four loaves and causing a fuss that prevents the production of
two loaves. The response of the average to this rule is to cut back to ten
loaves so as to avoid the inspection. 31 For the skilled, however, cutting back
does not make sense, he prefers to make his full capacity of twenty loaves,
even if six are lost, four eaten by the klutz and two wasted due to the klutz's
fuss. 32 The result is that the skilled has fourteen, the klutz nine and the
average has ten loaves. This is a superior outcome to the inefficient tax. The
source of the efficiency is that the work of the skilled was not deterred,
because the burden that the rule placed on the skilled operated as a sunk
30. See Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 29, at 55 ("[O]ne of the few general results of
optimal tax analysis is that the tax rate on the last dollars earned by the most able (that is,
highest wage) member of society should be zero.").
31. Even if the average made all the loaves he could, the inspection would cost him six
loaves. He prefers giving up two than losing six.
32. The reason that the skilled would not reduce the number of loaves is that, once he
bakes more than 10 loaves, he keeps the entirety of each additional loaf. The skilled baker
would either bake 10 loaves and avoid the inspection, or bake 20 loaves, suffer the inspection,
and be left with 14 loaves. He prefers the latter if he would not sacrifice loaves eleven through
fourteen to obtain the additional rest from baking only ten loaves.
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payment rather than as a proportional tax on every loaf. The klutz and the
skilled are in the same position, and the average baker has one extra loaf.
Despite that this redistributive rule is wasteful, because two loaves are lost,
its deterrence of work is less than that of the suboptimal tax.
Existing tax schemes are far from optimal. They deter work a lot,
perhaps more than some redistributional rules. Substituting such a
redistributional rule for incremental tax reduction could produce a net
reduction in the deterrence of work. Therefore, such redistributional rules
would be desirable substitutes of taxes.
B. Frequent Desirability Compared to Optimal Taxation
To explore the possibility of desirable redistributive rules in the face of
optimal taxation, build an example illustrating the case where the
redistributional rules is conceded to be preferable to the optimal tax. This is
the case of a bias that deters leisure and is discussed in the next subsection.
This also reveals that distortions that are not general may be superior to an
optimal tax, discussed in Part IVB2. Superior to an optimal tax are also rules
that operate on revealed skills, as might the example of subsidized housing,
discussed in Part IVB3. Most importantly, superior to an optimal tax are
rules that redistribute non-monetary welfare, as might the examples of legal
abortion, bottle laws, or the homeownership bias, discussed in Part IVB4.
Part IVB5 closes this discussion by showing how tax rules, by definition,
cannot perform these functions.
1. Deterring Leisure
Deterring leisure restores incentives for work. Imposing redistributive
rules that deter leisure improves the incentives of the tax system even if
optimal. To understand this effect we need to start with an example.
Start with a society where each individual has different productive
capacity, like the. bakers of the previous example, and impose an optimal
income tax. Even the optimal income tax deters work, therefore some
production is lost as some reduce work and devote more time to their
favorite leisure activity, such as skiing. Those who feel some deterrence
from work due to the income tax, reduce work because the tax makes work
less remunerative and less appealing than leisure, skiing. This environment
can be improved by a reduction in the income tax and a burden on leisure
activities, such as excessive liability for accidents caused by leisure
activities like skiing. As leisure becomes less appealing, the product of the
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society will increase as the tax-motivated skiers find some work preferable
to skiing. The tweaked tort rule, however, causes some redistribution as well
as induces more work. An attempt to return to the optimal tort rule and
produce the same redistribution by an incremental increase of the income tax
would fail. The higher tax rates along with the elimination of the excessive
liability would lead tax-motivated skiers to reduce their work even more in
favor of skiing. Redistribution, therefore, is achieved at a lower cost by the
biased tort rule than by the tax system.33
The superiority of this non-tax rule is conceded by the Shavell
proponents. 34 Their first answer could have been that the result is an
undesirable distortion of the choice of the activity. 35 They do argue,
however, that the desirability of the distorted tort rule in this example is
exceptional.
The redistributive tort liability of the example does alter the incentives
to engage in the activity. This alteration, however, is small, is desirable, and
is redistributive. The basis of the claim of an undesirable distortion is that
the greater risk of liability is equivalent to an "excise" or "use tax" on the
33. For the argument that a related bias in favor of safety issues is desirable on
redistributive grounds, see Geistfeld, supra note 8.
34. In a brief comment on optimal tax, Kaplow and Shavell concede that superior
alternatives to the optimal income tax exist:
[T]axes or subsidies on particular commodities might have indirect effects that reduce
the distortion of an income tax. In particular, by taxing complements of leisure and by
subsidizing substitutes, one can reduce the labor-leisure distortion and thereby
improve welfare by more than the inefficiency that results from distorted purchases of
the taxed or subsidized commodities.... Thus, although a complete and sophisticated
analysis does not demonstrate that it could never be efficient to change legal rules
from what narrowly seem to be the most efficient ones, there is no general argument
for adjustments of a conventionally redistributive type.
Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2, at 680-81. The example of the text
imposes tort liability on activities complementary to leisure. Thus, this redistributive feature is
superior to even an optimal tax. The housing subsidy discussed in note 23 and the existing
and proposed rules discussed in Parts IV and V, however, are redistributive and not
complements of leisure. These rules are more than exceptions to a "general argument" against
redistribution by non-tax rules. Instead of the Shavell position discouraging the development
of such rules, this essay argues that Law and Economics scholars should pursue the creation
of such rules.
35. The distortion issue does not receive appropriate attention when Shavell's side
reiterates that the example is exceptional. Kaplow & Shavell, Clarifying, supra note 2, at 829
(considering a subsidy to poor yachters a substitute of a more redistributive tax system). A
subsidy to poor skiers or yachters would influence conduct and the choice of the activity,
inducing them, perhaps, to reduce work.
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activity, causing an undesirable general reduction in its quantity. 36 However,
the threat of tort liability is unlike a tax on the activity because it does not
burden the poor. The bankruptcy policy of the fresh start ensures that the
poor skier or yachtsman, who is assigned the large tort liability, can
discharge it. Thus, the implicit price increase due to the greater tort liability
is not general but restricted to the rich, revealing that the redistributional
rule in not equivalent to a use tax.
To the extent the tort liability distorts choice, the distortion is desirable.
Among the rich, whom bankruptcy does not protect from the liability, 37 the
greater liability will change conduct. To the extent that the fear of liability
deters some high-income individuals from the activity, this is a desirable
distortion in favor of productivity and against leisure. Thus, redistribution by
the excessive liability is desirable even compared to an optimal income tax.
The optimal income tax would be the best alternative that the Shavell side
could offer to the redistributive tort rule and would suggest an increase of
income taxes so as to raise exactly the amount that the tort rule would
redistribute. The increased income tax, however, would distort the decision
whether to pursue work or leisure, inducing some to reduce work in favor of
leisure. The result is undesirable because this implies a drop in productivity.
By contrast, the fear of excessive tort liability has the exact opposite effect.
The most productive individuals are induced to consider leisure less
appealing, devote more time to work, and increase the national product.
Moreover, the distortion that the excessive tort liability induces has a
desirable redistributive side-effect. Since only the rich fear liability, the rich
will be led to engage in excessive care. The consequence is that the activity
becomes safer for the poor who will suffer fewer accidents and need to
engage in less precaution. To the extent the cost of precaution is inversely
36. Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2, at 681 ("[W]hether an activity
should be penalized or subsidized depends on how the activity affects the labor-leisure choice,
not on whether it is undertaken disproportionately by the rich."). The reduction of the activity
would be undesirable because it would reduce total surplus from the activity. If ski lift tickets
were $30 but carried a $10 tax surcharge, skiers who derive $31 to $40 or enjoyment from
skiing lose the net $1 to $10 benefit they would have enjoyed after paying the $30 ticket.
Unlike a true change of prices, the tax means that producer surplus will not substitute the lost
consumer surplus. Regions that can offer skiing at a cost of $30 to $39 do not become
competitive, cannot sell tickets, and do not enjoy the net $1 to 10 gain they would have if
price were truly at $40.
37. Bankruptcy law is available to everyone. It does require, however, that all non-
exempt assets be used to pay all debts. It is the assets of the rich that make them subject to the




related to skill and the poor are poor because of lack of skill, the reduction in
precaution may radically change the ability of the less skilled poor to engage
in the activity, perhaps changing the required precaution from infeasible to
feasible. Increased safety, reduced precaution demands, and feasible
precaution are benefits that the excessive liability confers on the poor,
making the activity more hospitable to the poor. Instead of the reduction in
aggregate demand that a usage tax would induce, the excessive tort rule
makes the activity more appealing to the poor, directly conferring a benefit,
consumer surplus, to them. Not only is this desirable, but this benefit is
redistributive in nature, in the sense that the poor participate more in the
activity. Contrary to a use tax on the activity "undertaken disproportionately
by the rich ' 38 which would further rarify the activity, the redistributional
tort rule democratizes the activity. The redistributive tort rule does not only
redistribute funds, but it also directly redistributes enjoyment and welfare.
The example is not exceptional, despite that Shavell's side argues it is.39
The argument that the redistributive tort rule is exceptional takes us back to
a comparison with an optimal income tax substitute. If the income tax were
optimal, some use taxes, excise taxes, or commodity taxes may still be
desirable, but they would be exceptional in a world without uncertainty.
40
The excessive tort liability from leisure accidents may be desirable, but
would be claimed to fall in the same exception. Occasionally, use taxes can
be desirable in an optimal tax environment, because the optimal tax is still
an income tax that reduces incentives to produce, that distorts the decision
for work or leisure in favor of leisure, reducing aggregate product. Use taxes
38. Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2, at 681.
39. Id. at 681 ("[Tlhere is no general argument for adjustments of a conventionally
redistributive type.").
40. The general futility of taxes on "commodities" (used in abstract, hence including a
use tax of the type discussed here) is shown by David E. Wildasin, Distributional Neutrality
and Optimal Commodity Taxation, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 889 (1977).
Recent scholarship, however, shows that if individuals are uncertain about their future
prospects, an optimal tax regime does include commodity taxes. A model of two goods, one
necessary (for example, housing) and one discretionary, shows that the optimal taxation
regime includes a subsidy on the necessary good. A rough estimate of the optimal subsidy on
housing is calculated at about 25%! See generally Helmuth Cemer & Firouz Gahvari,
Uncertainty, Optimal Taxation, and the Direct Versus Indirect Tax Controversy, 105 ECON. J.
1165, 1178 (1995) ("[R]elative to other goods, housing prices must be subsidized by as much
as 25%."). Pursuing the notion that uncertainty justifies taxes on discretionary goods and
services, while arguing for a subsidy on goods and services that are necessary, can easily be
imported into law. Liability from accidents arising from the ownership of houses, such as slip-
and-fall accidents on icy sidewalks, could, arguably, be reduced or eliminated as a subsidy to
housing.
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can be desirable if they raise the same or more revenue while reducing the
bias against work. Thus, use taxes on activities that follow (are complements
of) leisure would reduce the attractiveness of leisure compared to work.4 1
Applied to the example of excessive redistributive tort liability, the
argument is that its desirability is exceptional because the liability is a
consequence of its construction as a burden of leisure. Thus, the Shavell side
would concede the desirability of this redistributional rule, but maintain that
redistributional rules are an exception. The exception would be justified
only in rules that apply to "strong complements [of,] or substitutes for
leisure." 42 The premise for this claim that the desirability of the
redistributive rule is exceptional is its equivalence with a use tax, but we
saw above that it is unlike a use tax. The redistributive rule of this example
is not exceptional, because it does not distort demand for the activity the
way that a use tax would, because the rule does not require the revelation of
skill, and because the rule redistributes more than the cost in dollars it
imposes on the rich.
2. Avoiding General Distortions
The redistributive rules are not exceptional because they do not distort
demand for the activity like a use tax would. A use tax would be imposed on
every skier or every yachtsman. A use tax would be desirable only in
exceptional cases because use taxes impose a large burden on the activity.
Use taxes reduce the quantity of the activity by making it more expensive,
and the reduction is undesirable because it reduces welfare. Take the
example of the $10 use tax on the $30 skiing ticket. Every skier who chooses
not to pay the $40 price but would have gone skiing if tickets were at $30,
has lost enjoyment. Redistributive rules that operate by imposing rare large
liability, however, are very different from a use tax that raises that same
funds. Bankruptcy law grants every insolvent debtor the right to a fresh start.
Since the large liability would render every poor skier insolvent, they would
utilize their bankruptcy law right to discharge the liability. The consequence
is that poor skiers would not be influenced by the redistributive rule. This is
a general, rather than an exceptional result. Redistributive rules that operate
41. Taxes on "commodities" (and activities) complementary to leisure and subsidies on
those complementary to work will improve welfare by reducing the incentive to avoid work.
See generally C.C. Yang & Hans Haller, Directions of Commodity Tax Reform in the
Presence of a Given Non-Linear Income Tax Schedule, 26 CANAD. J. ECON. 469 (1993).
42. Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2, at 680.
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by imposing rare large liability will never influence the incentives of the
poor because the poor can discharge the liability.43
3. Getting Directly to Skill
Redistributive rules may operate where skill is revealed. Again, we must
compare to the exceptional nature of use taxes in a regime of optimal income
tax. The optimal income tax is optimal only if income, rather than
productive capacity (called here "skill") is the observable characteristic of
individuals.44 If skill were observable, any tax scheme with no distortions
would be possible, including complete redistribution. Hypothesize two
taxpayers, one with the skill to produce up to $200 of product and one with
the skill to produce up to $50. With skill being observable, simply impose a
lump-sum $75 tax on the first, and give the proceeds to the second. This
would not distort incentives for work because both taxpayers would receive
the full benefit of additional income. The skilled one, knowing that reducing
work does not reduce the tax liability, will not work less.
Proposing such a scheme when skill is not observable may induce the
first to only produce $50 to avoid the tax, and devote the extra time to play
and other leisure activities. An optimal income tax is the best theoretical
alternative, as it is designed to induce the least possible incentive to avoid
work. In exceptional cases, use or excise taxes can improve upon the optimal
income tax by circumventing the impossibility of observing skill. Skill
remains not visible, but the tax reaches it because skill is revealed in the
circumstances that trigger the tax, so that the skilled choose to pay the tax
and the unskilled do not. This is an improvement over raising the same
43. I must rush to say that this does not argue for overall excessive tort penalties. One
might be led to so believe by noting that bankruptcy always protects the poor from liability.
Overall excessive tort liability would cancel the source of the desirability of the biased rule of
the example. The bias was desirable because it cancelled the income tax system's disincentive
for work. If all activities of the rich carry the same burden, then the redistribution would not
only have the same incentive effects as the tax and the rich would take wasteful care. The
double distortion returns.
44. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New
New Welfare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLiC ECONOMICS 991, 992 (Alan J. Auerbach
& Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) ("It is this limitation on the information of the government
which results in taxation being distortionary, and which gives rise to the trade-off between
equity and efficiency."). The optimal tax research starts with Mirlees, who received the 1996
Nobel memorial prize in economics. See James Mirlees, An Exploration in the Theory of
Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REv. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971). The Nobel press release and
information is available on line at www.nobel.se (last visited March 13, 2002).
[Vol. 33:279308
SOLUTIONS TO DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
revenue with an income tax, since no work incentives are distorted. Such a
use tax that produces revelation of skill would be considered exceptional, if
not impossible, because no such settings appear to be recognized in the
optimal tax literature.45 The desirability of the redistributive rule, however,
does not rest on its ability to induce a revelation of skill. Rather, its
desirability exists despite its inability to reveal skill. The general protection
the bankruptcy gives to all the poor mans that all the individuals with low
skill do choose the activity without suffering the penalty, i.e., without paying
the substitute of the use tax. Thus, the desirability of the redistributive rule,
rather than being an exceptional phenomenon of revelation of skill, is the
norm, because redistribution by large rare liability does not burden those
who have little skill.46
An example in the line of the signaling literature can be hypothesized to
show how a redistributional rule would avoid distortions by operating upon
the revelation of skill. A distortive redistributional rule is a general subsidy,
that is available in the form of a welfare check payment to everyone who
makes less than some income. Such a rule would deter work for some of
those who would lose the subsidy. Juxtapose to this a general subsidy, called
public housing, which happens to only be used by those of low skill. This
would not create a distortion because the skilled would not have a
disincentive to work, since they do not use public housing. The background
setting would have employers pay a premium to skilled employees, but at the
time of hiring, employers cannot determine who is skilled and who is not.
While candidates for employment know their skill, they cannot communicate
it credibly to employers because candidates of high and low skill can make
45. Although the optimal tax literature does not offer examples of use taxes, excise
taxes or commodity taxes that induce the revelation of skill, see supra note 23, argued that
some housing subsidies may induce the revelation of skill if the skilled are induced to not use
subsidized housing. A different model does present the possibility that corporations are led to
reveal their quality. See Siew Hong Teoh & Chuan Yang Hwang, Nondisclosure and Adverse
Disclosure as Signals of Firm Value, 4 REv. FIN. STUD. 283 (1991) (presenting a model
where investors induce firms to send credible signals of their quality although it is not
verifiable); see also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize
Informed Traders?, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 417, 420 (1996) (explaining the Teoh &
Hwang model).
46. Shavell's side also argues that this exception does not lead to a general rule for
biasing rules against the rich because such a policy would discourage activities that allow the
rich to be more productive, see Kaplow & Shavell, Clarifying, supra note 2. To follow the
skiing example, if the rich could either ski or walk to their place of business, imposing
excessive liability on accidents will make the rich walk, reducing their productivity and
aggravating the bias against work of the income tax. This answer does not apply here, because
the activity (skiing) is by hypothesis a leisure activity.
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the same statement. Suppose that employees "signal" their quality to
employers by declining a verifiable subsidy, such as physical housing.47
Only the truly skilled can afford the signal, because the wage premium that
employers pay to those who forego public housing is less than the subsidy. 48
Thus, the non-tax redistribution (public housing in this example) does not
reduce the incentives of the skilled to work because the skilled forego the
subsidy. Therefore, the biased rule can be preferable to its optimal income
tax substitute.49
4. Redistributing Non-Monetary Welfare
Redistributive rules are also not exceptional when their redistributive
consequences are greater than the monetary redistribution they cause. In
other words, the poor gain more than the number of dollars that the rule
makes the rich pay. In the case of the excessive liability on accidents from a
leisure activity, the poor gain not only the actual payments that the liable
rich make, but the poor also gain the consequences of the excessive care that
the rule imposes on the rich: increased safety, reduced precaution demands,
and feasible precaution. The rule makes the activity more hospitable to the
47. Declining a welfare check, by comparison, would not be verifiable. Employers
would not be able to determine the truth of statements by candidates for employment that they
declined their welfare checks.
48. The candidates of high skill are willing to forego public housing because subsequent
wage increases will more than compensate for the loss. To be complete and justify public
housing as a measure that increases welfare regardless of distribution, a pure signaling model
would have to also show that the same outcome does not materialize without public housing.
The example may be expanded to have the employers train employees in the first year of
employment but have training be cost-justified only if it were offered to candidates of high
skill. Then public housing would be necessary to separate those of high skill, and without
public housing no training would be offered (and candidates could not finance they own
training because lenders would also not be able to observe skill). While this extension is
plausible and necessary for public housing to be necessary for increasing welfare, it is not
necessary to justify public housing as a redistributional rule. Even if the same aggregate
welfare is available to society without the public housing rule, making the rule pointless for
not increasing productivity, public housing is desirable for its redistributional consequences.
Public housing in this setting would not involve a reduction in work and would increase
redistribution, therefore it would be superior to both the same society without any subsidy and
the same society with a general subsidy that would reduce work.
49. For the substitute subsidy to be part of the income tax, it would have to be general,
offered to every member of society. Public housing is not a component of the income tax in
this example because it would be restricted to specific buildings (this is also what makes it
verifiable). The generality of the income tax is discussed further below, at the end of this Part.
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poor, as shown above. 50 Back to the rule's substitute under optimal income
tax: The redistributive payment that would qualify as a substitute for the
redistributive rule must include both the amount of the actual monetary
redistribution that the rule induces, as well as the benefit to the poor due to
the excessive care of the rich. For example, even though rich skiers pay only
$100 in liability payments to the poor, the poor skiers in aggregate enjoy not
only this redistribution of $100 of wealth, but also hospitable slopes,
reduced and feasible precaution, as well as fewer accidents. 51 Suppose that
all these benefits to the poor are enjoyed by $50. The increase in tax that
would be equivalent to the redistributive rule is not only the $100 of actual
redistribution, but the entire $150 benefit that the poor receive. Therefore,
the increase in taxation that would produce the same outcome would be
$150, rather that the actual $100 cost that the rich skiers bear. The
redistribution by means of the tax must raise more funds than the
redistribution by means of the non-tax rule. Therefore, the distortion caused
by the tax, even if the tax were optimally designed, is likely greater than the
distortion caused by the redistributive rule.52 The desirability of the
50. See supra text accompanying note 38.
51. Some of the accidents that do not happen might have been compensated by liability,
so that their non-occurrence does not improve, in theory, the position of the would-be victims.
Some of the avoided accidents, however, would not have triggered liability for any of a
number of reasons, including insufficient care of the injured skier. Those avoided accidents
that would have remained uncompensated, do constitute an improvement of the poor skiers'
lot.
52. Of course, the Shavell team would promptly respond that the $100 figure also
understates the cost of the rule to the rich skiers, because it does not include the cost of their
additional, wasteful precaution. The rich would expend more in care than the avoided
expected accident costs, in the sense that if the rich expended $50 in additional care, that
avoids less than $50 of accidents, but the rich still take this care because it avoids $50 of
liability. The actual liability would understate the cost of the rule to the rich, due to the
increased, wasteful care it induces. Suppose the additional cost of care is $50 and the $100
liability to the poor is the result of the wastefully reduced risk of accidents. Optimal care
would have led to more accidents that would have cost less than $50 (since, if the $50 care
reduced accidents by more than $50 it would have been optimal). These accidents would have
not have triggered liability, because they would have resulted under optimal care. Therefore,
the avoided uncompensated accidents must be added to the benefits that the poor derive from
the rule. Thus, the distortionary rule can only be replaced by a tax greater than the aggregate
costs to the rich of accidents plus additional care. Yet a different line of thinking would be
that the increased care of the rich allows the reduction of the precaution of the poor. If the
poor face the same costs of precaution as the rich, the reasonable blind guess of the benefit of
reduced precaution should be the same $50 that the additional care costs to the rich. To the
extent the rich tend to be skilled and the poor less skilled, the poor will not be as efficient of
precaution as the rich are in care. Accordingly, the avoided precaution of the poor would
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redistributional rule is not exceptional because even an optimal tax would
have to be increased by more than the cost of the redistributive rule to the
rich. Three examples of substantive rules that redistribute more welfare than
money show that they are not exceptionally rare.
Starting with the more controversial example, consider first the
availability of legal abortions and the effect of the availability on teenagers'
educational opportunities. 53 Suppose that teenagers of high skill expect large
returns from further education, while teenagers of low skill do not, and the
delivery of a baby increases dramatically the cost of more education by
reducing the teenage parent's available time and, by occasional ear
infections, imposing random disruptions of potentially high cost such as
missed exams. Consider first a prohibition on abortions. Teenagers'
incentives differ depending on their skill. Teenagers of high skill perceive a
pregnancy as more undesirable, because the reduction in their educational
capacity that it would bring would carry a great cost; being skilled and
educated would lead to significantly greater wages than being skilled and not
educated. Accordingly, teenagers of high skill devote much care to avoid
pregnancies if abortions are not available. Unwanted pregnancies do occur,
but due to the increased care of skilled teenagers, they occur
benefit the poor more than the increased care of the rich burdens the rich. Thus, the avoided
precaution may more than cancel the increased care.
53. The significant rationality of pregnancy and abortion choices is manifest in the empirical
evidence. Evidence supports the hypothesis of the text that the availability of abortion
increases the opportunities for schooling in minorities (read "in the disadvantaged" according
to the main text) and little effect in the majority (read "those having large wage gains from
education" according to the hypothesis of the text). See generally Joshua D. Angrist &
William N. Evans, Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of the 1970 State Abortion
Reforms, NBER Working Paper W5406, available at www.ssm.com (last visited on April 8,
2002), in 18 RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS 75 (S. Polachek ed., 1999). Similar results are
reported in Adam Ashcraft, Identifying the Consequences of Teenage Childbearing, available
at www.ssrn.com (last visited April 8, 2002). The choice to not have a potentially desirable
(in-wedlock) pregnancy in the face of increased difficulty of obtaining an abortion is
documented, along with a thorough review of the literature, by Thomas Kane & Douglas
Steiger, Teen Motherhood and Abortion Access, 111 Q.J. EcON. 467 (1996). The rational
choice to travel to states with liberal abortion laws before the universal legalization, is used to
determine the benefit due to the availability of abortion. See generally Timothy A. Deyak &
V. Kerry Smith, The Economic Value of Statute Reform: The Case of Liberalized Abortion,
84 J. POL ECON. 83 (1976). Deborah Haas-Wilson reports evidence that income increases the
demand for abortions, consistently with the hypothesis of the text. See Deborah Haas-Wilson,
The Impact of State Abortion Restrictions on Minors'.Demand for Abortions, 31 J. HuMAN
RESOURCES 140, 154-55 (1996).
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disproportionately to the less skilled teenagers and reduce disproportionately
their future education and income. Consider now the legalization of
abortion. Skilled and unskilled teenagers alike can terminate unwanted
pregnancies, eliminating the hazard to education and increased earnings.
This benefits both groups, but most of the gain accrues to unskilled
teenagers as a group, because the skilled teenagers would avoid most
unwanted pregnancies if abortion were prohibited. Legalized abortion has a
redistributive effect, increasing the earning capacity of unskilled teenagers.
A tax policy that would replicate this redistributive effect would impose an
income tax and use the proceeds to help teenagers avoid unwanted
pregnancies and to mitigate the educational impediments by providing, for
example, daycare in high schools and universities. Even if this policy
managed to restore all education that would have been missed, it is an
inferior alternative, because the incremental increase of the income tax
would deter work. If receiving the daycare subsidy depended on being poor,
then the tax substitute of the redistributive rule would impose a second
distortion. It would deter work, because work may lead to loss of the
subsidy.
For the second example, consider the adoption of "bottle laws" 54 that set
up a scheme of a refundable deposit at the purchase of drinks in cans,
refunded when the can is properly disposed (recycled). Even without the
deposit, wealthy neighborhoods would spend to keep the neighborhood
clean. The effect of the law is felt mostly on poor neighborhoods 55 which
would not devote comparable resources to street cleaning. Therefore, bottle
laws have a redistributional effect. Moreover, the bottle laws do not produce
an incentive to avoid work. The deposit causes containers not to litter rich
and poor areas alike. It neither induces a preference for poverty nor a penalty
on wealth. 56 Compare the deposit to a tax increase and the spending of the
proceeds on the cleaning of poor neighborhoods. The tax creates the
incentive to avoid wealth in order to avoid the tax and to not clean the
neighborhood so as to keep the subsidy. Notice that these are two
distortions. Even if the increased cleaning cost the same five cents per
54. For a recent discussion, see Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV.
1231, 1266 & nn. 141-46 (2001) (discussing the adoption and evolution of beverage container
deposit laws).
55. Bottle laws also have a pronounced effect on rural areas. For the purpose of the
example this can be ignored. The reduction of litter in rural areas is consistent with this
discussion of the effects of the rule.
56. That bottle laws do not penalize wealth is buttressed by the fact that the rich who
choose to recycle their cans can obtain the refund.
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cleaned bottle, 57 and even if it were funded by an optimal income tax, it is
less desirable.
The homeownership bias is the result of a web of rules designed to make
home acquisitions easy and desirable.58 It operates by inducing the residents
of homes to take care of their homes and neighborhoods. Home owners have
much stronger incentives than renters to maintain their house and to preserve
the quality of the neighborhood. 59 Even without a homeownership bias,
wealthy neighborhoods' houses would tend to have an attractive and well-
maintained appearance. The inducement to maintain the house and care for
the neighborhood is felt mostly in poor areas where, under the alternative of
predominantly rental housing, maintenance would tend to be inferior and
neighborhood involvement less. Although the incentives of the
homeownership bias benefit every social segment, the least mobile and
57. It is important to hypothesize that bottle laws do not reduce the true cost of
cleaning. If bottle laws also reduce the cost of cleaning, then they constitute of an efficiency
gain, which would make them desirable independently of their redistributive effect. For the
bottle laws to be desirable only for their redistributive effect, the alternative cleaning costs,
funded by an income tax, must be hypothesized to be the same five cents per can that induces
the removal of can litter by persons other than the drinker under the bottle laws. Bottle laws
can be argued to distort the choice of beverage away from canned drinks and in favor of
drinks in cartons. An income tax would remove that distortion. The distortion is small because
it is restricted to the drinkers who will not recycle their cans.
58. The tax measures that produce a bias in favor of home ownership are the non-
taxation of imputed rent and the mortgage deduction, I.R.C. § 25 (West 2000). Non-tax rules
that create biases in favor of home ownership range from the facilitation of home mortgage
lending and trading to the exemption of residences from foreclosures and bankruptcy
liquidations. See Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus on
Exemption Laws, 74 Am. BANKR. L.J. 275 (2000) (describing state exemptions and analyzing
reform proposals); William E. Nelson & Norman R. Williams, Suburbanization and Market
Failure: An Analysis of Government Policies Promoting Suburban Growth and Ethnic
Assimilation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 228-29 (1999) (discussing the federal facilitation of
home financing). Moreover, the bias in favor of homeownership is not a tax rule. The bias in
favor of home ownership are substantive, because they change conduct from renting to
owning.
59. The incentives of ownership and their erosion are discussed in J.V. Henderson & Y.
M. loannides, A Model of Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AMER. ECON. REv. 98 (1983); Thomas
J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, Reverse Mortgages and Borrower Maintenance Risk, 22 J. AM.
R.E. & URB. EcoN. Assoc. 433 (1994); see also John Harding et al., Deficiency Judgments
and Borrower Maintenance: Theory and Evidence, 9 J. HOUSING ECON. 267 (2000) (finding
that maintenance depends on risk of deficiency judgment by mortgagee against owner); John
Harding, Do Owners Take Better Care of Their Housing than Renters?, 28 REAL EST. ECON.
663 (2000) (finding no evidence that the possibility of resale to a buyer who does not observe
past maintenance leads to reduced maintenance, but finding that the sharing the loss with the
mortgagee does lead to marginally reduced maintenance by the owner).
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poorest home owners reap a disproportional share of the benefit. Therefore,
the homeownership bias has a redistributional consequence. Moreover, the
homeownership bias does not induce a distortion to avoid wealth or to prefer
leisure. 60 The bias operates on the wealthy and the poor alike. It neither
induces a preference for poverty nor a penalty on wealth. Compare the
homeownership bias with a tax rule that would (1) treat renting on an equal
footing with home ownership and (2) an optimal tax increase that is used to
enhance poor neighborhoods. Of the two, only the tax rule creates, first, an
incentive to avoid wealth due to the income tax, and, second, an incentive to
avoid work in order to receive the subsidy. Again the two distortions burden
the optimal income tax substitute.
In all three examples, the source of the desirability of the redistributive
rule compared to an optimal tax is that the rules confer a redistributional
benefit that is not monetary. The superiority of the redistributive rule is that
it produces gains for the poor without imposing monetary costs. The non-
monetary gain means that the redistribution need not be financed by higher
income taxes that would deter work. The rules are desirable for their
redistributive effect even if tax could fund a program replicating the rules'
direct contribution to welfare, preventing loss of education from unwanted
pregnancies, cleaning streets to the same level as bottle laws, maintaining
and upgrading neighborhoods to the same degree as homeownership.
Moreover, if the substitutes contain a targeted subsidy, as all three
realistically would, we observe a reversal of the double distortion argument.
The double distortion burdens the income tax substitute rather than the
redistributive rule.
In sum, the above analysis illustrated the limitations of the thesis that
redistribution by an optimal tax is preferred to redistribution by a suboptimal
rule. Redistribution by non-tax rules can easily be superior to redistribution
by actual, suboptimal taxation. Redistribution by non-tax rules can also be
superior to an optimal tax if the rules deter leisure, do not impose a general
distortion, apply on revealed skill, or effectuate a non-monetary
redistribution of welfare. The next section argues that taxes, by definition,
cannot redistribute non-monetary welfare.
60. This would not be true of a rule that would subsidize homeownership conditional on
low wealth. Such a rule would create a bias against wealth, because acquiring wealth would




5. Separating Tax and Substance
As the line separating tax from non-tax rules is an artificial and
formalistic one, the statement that redistribution should only be provided by
an optimal tax system is also vacuous. The tax system is not defined by the
proponents of this position.6 1 In an attempt to determine what constitutes a
tax rule, a thought exercise can convert the entire legal system into tax rules.
Instead of the law of contracts imposing penalties for breach, posit a tax rule
imposing a tax for breaches of contracts and a subsidy to victims of breach.
Instead of a tort system imposing liability on injurers, posit a tax system
imposing a tax on injurers and granting a subsidy to those harmed. A
sufficiently elaborate tax scheme can reproduce the incentives of substantive
rules. This cannot be the essential role of tax rules. The incentives that
substantive law provides would not be true taxes, even if they were provided
by the tax system. The distinguishing feature of rules that provide such
incentives is that they do not raise revenue for the government. Instead,
substantive rules create incentives by causing potential movements of funds
between parties conditional on events or conduct. For example, a rule
deterring breaches of contracts, whether written in the Internal Revenue
Code or not, produces an incentive not to breach so as to avoid the transfer
of compensation to the counterparty. This movement of funds also produces
an incentive to avoid the payment and to receive the subsidy, but this
consequence is not general, burdening all the rich and benefiting all the
poor. Redistribution by non-tax rules, however, includes the redistribution of
welfare beyond the redistribution of any payment. Redistributive tax rules
only redistribute funds directly or indirectly by funding the provision of
services.
61. See Kaplow & Shavell, Redistributing, supra note 2, at 667 n.l ("For purposes of this
article, the term "legal rules" refers to rules other than those that define the income tax and
welfare system."). The income tax and the welfare system are not defined. Despite spending
much attention to the definition of income, no definition of tax rules is given in Louis
Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994). That tax
policy occasionally deviates from simply financing the government and tries to influence
incentives in ways similar to those of substantive law makes the distinction all the more
important. One of the countless examples of such taxes is that on "greenmail," which is the
buyout at a premium of hostile shareholders' shares in order to induce them not to seek
control of the corporation. See I.R.C. § 5881 (West 2000) (taxing greenmail at 50%); see, e.g.,
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Corporate Defense Law for Dispersed Ownership, 30 HoFSTRA
L REV. 11, 30-32 (2001) (discussing greenmail).
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Thus, tax rules seem identified by three features: observability,
generality, and monetization. Observability captures the notion that taxes do
not attempt to identify not readily observable characteristics. Rather, taxes
respond to readily quantifiable measures such as income, price, or
consumption. Generality means that taxes apply to every individual or to
every individual with the observable characteristic. Taxes are general both
as burdens and as subsidies. As burdens, taxes fall identically on every
individual or at least on every individual of the same observable
characteristic, be it income or consumption. The generality of the
redistribution has the same shape of the generality of the imposition of taxes.
Subsidies and services are general, in the sense that they are available to
either every member of society or to every poor member. For example, the
demogrant would be a subsidy available to every member, and public
schooling or national defense are services offered to every member. Finally,
monetization indicates that the direct consequence of taxes is the movement
of funds, rather than the imposition of conduct. Taxes raise money and use it
to fund subsidies or services. Putting all these elements together, it appears
that tax rules are the rules which impose general monetary charges and fund
general benefits, where both the charges and the benefits depend on readily
observable characteristics of members of society.
Redistributive non-tax rules may redistribute non-monetary welfare.
This shows the weakness of the preference for redistribution by means of the
tax system. The Shavell side only analyzes redistribution of funds, not
welfare. Unsurprisingly, when we realize that rules can redistribute more
than funds, the tax system is inapplicable. Rules that restore educational
opportunity or induce a cleaning of the inner city are the realm of
substantive law.
Tax rules also do not dwell on qualitative differences such as levels of
care or the adequacy of consideration, preferring instead universal
application in degrees that vary according to some readily ascertained
attribute, such as income or consumption. The borders of this definition of
the tax system, reminds of what limited the capacity of the optimal tax. The
optimal tax can be improved by a system that observes skill or other
attributes of productive capacity. Tax law does not dwell that deep. It should
come as no surprise that rules that redistribute without distorting incentives
take into account details beyond dollar income and, therefore, are not tax
rules. Definitions do not prove, but they do exclude. Rules that provide
redistribution of non-monetary welfare and rules that depend on other
attributes, including schemes to induce the revelation of skill, are not tax
rules. All rules should be designed optimally, but it seems that according to
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this definition, rules that provide much redistribution with little distortion of
the incentives for work are not tax rules.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: REDISTRIBUTIVE INCENTIVES
Statisticians can attempt to measure the effect of redistribution on
growth, 62  optimal tax theory can propose universal subsidies and
diminishing marginal tax rates, 63 and others can explore whether the optimal
redistribution scheme would exceed subjective preferences for it,64 but
62. Such estimates vary widely. Very large estimates of the loss in productivity are
made by Martin Feldstein, How Big Should Government Be?, supra note 25, and are reported
by Robert W. McGee, Some Tax Advice for Latvia and Similarly Situated Emerging
Economies, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. Law 223, at notes 64-68 and accompanying text (1996)
(reporting growth reduction of 1.1% annually due to the distortive effects of taxation and an
annual loss of 33% of revenue). A study finding that tax reductions increase growth was
questioned. See Reinhard B. Koester & Roger C. Kormendi, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and
Economic Growth: Cross-Country Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 27 ECON.
INQUIRY 367 (1989) (finding that tax cuts increased productivity); cf Charles Garrison &
Feng-Yao Lee, Taxation, Aggregate Activity and Economic Growth: Further Cross-Country
Evidence on Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 172 (1992) (questioning the
conclusions of Koester & Kormendi). The problem with estimates of incentive effects is that
in the long run the return on capital and the cost of goods should adjust to the demand for
saving and consumption that the tax structure induces and cancel out the bias of the tax
system. A more immediate problem with the evidence is that evidence of increased
productivity may simply imply that when redistribution is too little, increasing it also
increases productivity because of the productivity-increasing side-effects of redistribution
such as better education, lower crime, and improved transportation. The distortive effect of
taxes must be estimated separately from the productivity gains due to redistribution.
Establishing the optimal degree of redistribution is a separate question than establishing the
optimal means to provide it. Cf. James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U.
L. Rnv. 825 (2001) (interpreting this evidence as indicating that more redistribution is
beneficial). Economists find redistribution increases growth. See, e.g., Woojin Lee & John E.
Roemer, Income Distribution, Redistributive Politics, and Economic Growth, 3 J. ECON.
GROWTH 217, 233 (1998); Gilles Saint Paul & Thierry Verdier, Inequality, Redistribution and
Growth: A Challenge to the Conventional Political Economy Approach, 40 EuR. ECON. REv.
719, 725-26 (1996); William Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth:
An Empirical Investigation, 32 J. MONETARY ECON. 417, 419, 421-22 (1993) (noting that the
effect of tax changes was unclear).
63. Optimal tax theory proposes a lump-sum payment to everyone, which is called a
demogrant. See Zelenak & Moreland, supra note 29, at 52-57 (considering demogrants
unrealistic).
64. See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, supra note 2; Kaplow & Shavell,
Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, supra
note 2.
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current redistribution seems clearly inadequate. Nevertheless, an incremental
increase in redistribution is seen as too costly in terms of the reduction that
increased taxes would impose on growth. This is the essential puzzle of
redistributive concerns, but Economic Analysis of law can break the
deadlock. Economic analysis of law has tools that can show the way out of
the confounding quandary of insufficient and yet unaffordable redistribution.
Two methods are proposed. The first deploys one of the cornerstones of
economic analysis, Coasean irrelevance. Rules should be designed so as to
reduce transaction costs and rights should be allocated so that the rich must
buy them from the poor. If transaction costs are low enough, the trades will
allocate the rights optimally while providing redistribution. The second
looks at proposals from the Law-and-Economics academy that redistribute
welfare directly, without distorting incentives, so as to facilitate the
production of more such rules.
Ronald Coase's work has been interpreted as saying that in a perfect
world, legal rules would be irrelevant (and continuing to say that in the real
world they are not because of transaction costs). 6 5 The first of this double
proposition of Coase can be called Coase' s irrelevance theorem. It states that
in a perfect world, people would agree to circumvent disadvantageous
assignments of rights and obligations. If the law entitled, for example,
farmers to fences, ranchers who wanted their cattle to graze unimpeded by
fences would buy that right if fencing were more expensive than grazing
elsewhere. If the law prohibited fences, farmers who wanted to keep cattle
off their land would buy that right from the ranchers if the injury by
trampling cattle cost more than moving the cattle elsewhere. Or, if factories
were entitled to pollute, downstream farmers would buy filters for upstream
polluters if the injury by the pollution was greater than the cost of the filter.
If polluting were prohibited, upstream polluters would buy the tolerance of
downstream farmers if the filter cost more than the pollution's injury. In the
world of Coasean irrelevance, the law does not determine outcomes. People,
the market, rearrange rights and obligations to override their wasteful
suboptimal allocations. 66
The Coase irrelevance theorem has had a defining influence on
economic analysis of law. It renders deregulation the "by default" desired
65. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & ECON. 1 (1960).
66. For a very readable introduction to Coasean analysis, see DAvID D. FRIEDMAN,
LAw's ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS RAs TO Do WITh LAW AND WHY IT MATrERS 36-46 (2000).
See also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Coasean Irrelevance 'Theorem', CALl lesson,
2002, which is accessible at my website, www.nicholasgeorgakopoulos.org, under the
teaching link, forthcoming at www.cali.org.
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system of regulation. Advocates of regulation bear the burden of proof that
the parties will not circumvent the rules or that this circumvention is
undesirable. But if redistribution is the goal when we look at the agreements
effectuated to circumvent rules, the presumption that Coasean irrelevance
creates is reversed. While for every other regulatory motive, Coasean
irrelevance suggests legal design is pointless, Coasean irrelevance suggests
that redistribution can be achieved with no loss of efficiency by inducing
agreements that circumvent sub-optimal assignments of rights. To
redistribute, for example, from the ranchers to the farmers, simply assign the
right of fencing to farmers. When ranchers will come and buy grazing rights
from the farmers, the desired redistribution will take place. Thus, while
Coasean irrelevance makes every argument about substantive regulation
much harder, it shows that the allocation of rights can further
redistributional goals without causing substantive distortion. The allocation
of rights that furthers redistribution does not reduce welfare, because the
parties will bargain around the suboptimal allocation. While Coasean
irrelevance casts doubt on the usefulness of every substantive rule, it also
creates a presumption that reallocation of rights to promote redistribution
will be equally irrelevant for substance and suboptimal allocations of rights
will be circumvented. If the suboptimal allocation is such that the
circumvention promotes redistributive goals-the rich buying rights from
the poor--Coasean irrelevance means that no efficiency is lost.
When we realize that the same Coasean irrelevance that hampers
rulemaking, encourages distributional reallocations, we should realize that
the discussion in Section IV about the desirability of distributional motives
in rules, was missing the proverbial boat. Distributional motives are by
default irrelevant. Rules motivated by distributional concerns do not produce
inefficiencies because the parties will "contract around" the rules or adjust
their conduct, either canceling the redistribution or imposing waste. In the
case of the redistributional policy of public schooling, the canceling
behavior is the "white flight" and the drop of the prices of homes in poor
school districts.67 The waste is the duplicative private funding of
independent schools to address the educational needs of that part of the
population that both cares about education and can afford the independent
schools.
Coasean irrelevance changes the mode of normative thought about
redistribution. Instead of conceiving of redistributive rules designed to direct
67. David M. Cutler et. al., The Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J. POL.
ECON. 455 (1999) (finding that whites pay more to live in white neighborhoods).
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payments, Coasean irrelevance suggests that redistribution would be
achieved by rules assigning rights, designing markets, and otherwise
facilitating Coasean trades, i.e., purchases of rights. Since this is a direct
consequence of Coasean irrelevance, I call this type of redistribution which
is achieved by means of Coasean bargains, Coasean redistribution.
Compared to taxation's forced taking of funds from the taxpayer, facilitating
trade is a subtler task for legal design. Nevertheless it is a task very familiar
to economic analysis scholars, one that has reached front-page prominence
with the success of the market for trading rights to sulfur dioxide
emissions.68 Trading regimes should be designed even more easily for
redistributive purposes than they were designed for environmental purposes.
Some applications exist and others are easy to envision.
The most familiar Coasean redistributive bargain is charitable giving.69
Consider also less overt redistributive bargains, such as the auction for
surrenders of seats in overbooked airplanes. Those for whom the reward is
worth the delay, give up their seats and receive the reward. Those are the
passengers who value speedy arrival the least, an attribute that is likely to
correlate, albeit imperfectly, with wealth. This is a bargain struck by the
airline as an intermediary of the passengers who value speedy arrival the
most, with the recipients of the redistributive payment. A different version
of a Coasean redistributive bargain is struck by an intermediary of the
beneficiaries, with the sources of the redistribution.
The government grants many rights that provide valuable incentives for
production but operate in a counter-redistributive manner. Patents,
copyrights and trademarks are at the source of massive accumulations of
wealth. They can all require the payment of a fee, depending on their value,
the proceeds of which can be used to further redistribution.70 The
68. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
69. For a discussion of the complexities surrounding charity and altruism, see Eric A.
Posner, Law and Society & Law and Economics: Common Ground, Irreconcilable
Differences, New Directions: Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous
Promises, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 567.
70. Collecting from successful patents and subsidizing a needed service is not only a
solution to a general social desire for equity, but it could also be structured to ameliorate the
problem of all the patents the owners of which visualized no commercial use at the time of
their filing, such as the gene sequence patents.
Numerous scholars have decried the rush to patent gene sequences of unknown
usefulness. See, e.g., Daniel L. McKay, Patent Law and Human Genome Research at the
Crossroads: The Need for Congressional Action, 10 SANTA CLARA CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 465, 466 (1994); Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene
Fragments, and Licensing the "Useful Arts," 7 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 295, 307-308 (1997)
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intellectual property protection granted to drug companies should require
payment of a fee that would be based on the actual sales of the patented item
(usually drug) during a first period of its commercial use. The proceeds of
this fee should be collected in a fund that would finance the underfunded
service, be it vaccinations, medical care for the poor, or basic research at
universities. The fund, of course, should be separated from general
government revenues, as so many similar plans are. A related regime is
already in effect on vaccines, imposing a fee for the benefit of the victims of
their side-effects, imposed by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act on
1986.71 Funds are collected by imposing a fee on the sale of vaccines and
the proceeds are used to compensate children who develop harmful side
effects. The redistribution is from the lucky, the children who do not develop
side effects but have to pay a higher price for the vaccine, to the unlucky
children who develop the harmful side effects.
The structure of such fees is not complex. The fee would be small
compared to projected sales. Moreover the fee would only be necessary for.
those patents that are actually commercially used, and would be due after
they are commercially used for a long enough period of time. Some patents
may never be used commercially, and their holder may never owe the fee.
Others may reach commercial use immediately or several years after the
granting of the patent. A reasonable period for the calculation of sales could
be two years and the baseline percentage for patents that reach immediate
commercial application may be 10% of those two years' sales. Patents that
reach commercial application later in the patent-protected period should pay
a smaller fraction, to compensate for the shorter remaining time for their
exploitation. The continued applicability of the parent protection should, of
course, depend on the payment of this fee, and incentives should be designed
so that its monitoring is left to the competitors who want to use the patent.
It is important to note that this proposal applies to every area of
intellectual property protection that the government grants. The copyright
protection given to movies and music can include such a fee that would
(discussing the "genetic goldrush"); Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of
Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199 (2000).
71. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-I to -34
(West 2001). The arrangement also precludes tort claims against the vaccine manufacturers.
See generally Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability in Blood
Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. REG'N 107, 123 et seq. (1995); Andrew R. Klein, Beyond
DES: Rejecting The Application of Market Share Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 68
TULANE L. REV. 883, 931 et seq. (1994); Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring,
64 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 29 (1998).
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subsidize neighborhood theaters or acting schools and regional orchestras
and music schools. The trademark protection could also include such a fee
that could subsidize architecture or design study. The copyright protection of
computer code can be used to subsidize computers for poor school districts.
The administration of the disbursement system must be made as automatic
as possible, perhaps by using matching funding that gives to the organization
a fraction of the proceeds it receives from the public. Thus schools, theaters
and museums would receive funds depending on their tuition income, ticket
sales, or donations. Institutions that do not have such income, as public
schools, would receive matching funds in their expenses, such as teacher
salaries or technology purchases.
Such fees would distort incentives to work, but probably less than an
incremental increase of the current income tax. The class that might be
influenced are those who develop works protected by intellectual property
rights. First, the fees only burden the most valuable of those rights, while
some redistributional benefits flow to others in the same class. That top
filmmakers are charged a fee does not influence the incentives to become a
filmmaker if the fee is used to reduce the cost of film school. Moreover,
those who obtain intellectual property rights will pass part of the cost of the
fee to the consumers. Nevertheless, when such an involuntary redistributive
scheme does reduce the incentive for work, it must also be compared to the
same redistribution by means of an optimal income tax. The proposed
measure may be superior because the redistributive burden is not general but
falls on filmmakers alone, or other recipients of intellectual property, and
because the acquisition of intellectual property rights may be a revelation of
skill. This would likely make such redistributive schemes superior to their
substitute even under an optimal income tax.72
72. The likely superiority of the proposal for a fee and targeted subsidies around
intellectual property rights, is due to the potential revelation of skill in the acquisition of
intellectual property rights and due to their lack of generality. The avoidance of a distortion
because of the revelation of skill is not be completely true, because the fee would still induce
the skilled to work less in the creation of the protected work. For example, the fee would
induce skilled filmmakers to be slightly less perfectionist in shooting their films, since the
income from the film is reduced by the amount of the fee. In other ways, however, the fee
would not allow the hiding of skill. Talented filmmakers cannot take advantage of their skill
without the intellectual property protection.
The concentration of the fee and the subsidy on the activity of the intellectual property
suggests that the distortion on the incentives to work that it causes could be smaller than a
general distortion induced by an income tax. Thus, although skilled filmmakers have an
incentive to work less, the distortion caused by the equivalent income tax could be greater
because it would distort the incentives of every taxpayer. The scheme would create an
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The experience with the trading of sulfur dioxide emissions, indicates
that firms can manage costs surprisingly well and with continued
improvements. When the permits began trading, their price was smaller than
expected, because firms had a better handle on pollution than anticipated. 73
The surprise was due to the lack of appreciation of the impact of profit on
corporations, institutions designed to produce profit. Once pollution had a
price, every link in the chain of the corporate organization, from chief
executives to janitors, recognized the interest to reduce pollution.
Unsurprisingly, pollution was reduced in creative and unexpected ways.74
This effectiveness is a typical example of the benefits that are not
available to an income tax alternative. An heavier income tax on polluting
factories would create a wasteful incentive to operate them less. The license
trading scheme created the desired incentive, to make them pollute less. The
superiority of the license trading regime is due to the fact that the incentives
it creates depend not on money but on the production of the targeted good,
cleanliness. The surprising effectiveness of corporations in fighting pollution
should indicate that a similar surprise may be in store for achieving
redistributional goals. Traded rights in the subject of the redistribution
would motivate and create incentives to achieve the goal directly, without
interposing the distortive effect of a monetary redistribution.
The incentives can be given directly or to intermediary entities. If the
goal is to reduce high school dropouts, teen pregnancy, or basic prenatal
care, the students who remain in school, not pregnant or the expecting
mothers who avoid specified risks and receive medical procedures, would
receive stipends. An intermediary, such as the school, the city, or city
hospitals, could also be given "licenses to failure", that would operate in
ways similar to the licenses to pollute. If the social failures are reduced, the
intermediary would receive a refund for, or sell the unnecessary licenses.
The licenses would not be needed if student performance exceeds the
undesirable bias in favor of the less skilled engaging in filmmaking in order to receive the
subsidy.
73. Daniel Cole has studied the sulfur trading rights emissions. See DANIEL H. COLE,
POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENvIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (forthcoming 2002, Cambridge University Press); Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the
Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE
ENVT'L L. & PoucY FOR. 103, 115 (1999).
74. Kurt Strasser discusses the numerous innovations that reduced pollution. See Kurt
A. Strasser, Preventing Pollution, 8 FORDHAM ENv. L.J. 1, 16-22, passim (1996) (discussing
several cases of major corporate innovation in the manufacturing process that dramatically
reduced pollution); see also Kurt A. Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention and
Environmental Regulation, 9 FoRDHAM ENv. L.J. 1 (1997).
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targets, if teenage pregnancy is less than expected, if prenatal care is better
than expected. For example, a standardized test could measure student's
performance and all students would receive stipends depending on their
performance; schools or cities could get funds depending on average scores
or licenses to failing students that they could sell if they are not needed to
cover the failing students. The goals must be adjusted for socioeconomic
background. 75 Prenatal care would probably follow a slightly different
pattern. Expecting mothers would be given vouchers with entries for the
required care, such as negative drug or alcohol tests, and the submission to
sonograms or other indicated tests. The vouchers would entitle them to a
distribution the size of which would depend on the fulfilled care. As an
intermediary, inner-city hospitals could be given licenses to overall newborn
health in their area. Although it initially seems more difficult, someone
might even be able to devise incentive schemes to address the more
evanescent deficiencies with which the Left accuses the capitalist system.
Perhaps incentive design could improve self-determination, self-realization,
meaningful work, or non-alienated relations. 76
The experience with emissions trading suggests that such proposals may
have very different results than simply the collection of a fee and its use for
school improvement or for the provision of preventive medicine. The
difference lies in that individuals and intermediary institutions will
internalize the goal directly. Institutions would put their effective creativity,
monitoring, and cost-reduction apparatus to bear on achieving results. Just as
the ranchers will do their best to achieve the goal of reducing the trampling
by their cattle, so the intermediary institutions which must buy pollution
licenses, non-graduation allowances, or skipped-prevention vouchers will do
their best to achieve the goals of reduced pollution, increased graduation
rates, the delivery of preventive medicine, or the desired service on which
their funding or profitability depends. A realistic implementation could
distribute tax-credit vouchers the usefulness of which would depend on the
improvement of the chosen statistic-high school test scores, preventive
medicine regimes, innovations in basic research and so forth. Entities in
regions that experience the improvement of the statistic would receive the
benefit of the tax credit. This would increase their incentives to help this
75. An adjustment for socioeconomic background is crucial. Otherwise such licenses
can operate in a counter-redistributive way, if poor school districts lose benefits for violating
their licenses. To avoid this, licenses should be granted to school districts according to their
current tests scores, adjusted for performance shortfalls explained by socioeconomic status,
and normalized for aggregate changes in students' performance over the years.
76. A similar hint exists in Schlag, supra note 1, at 953.
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improvement. Such vouchers would be superior to the income tax alternative
because instead of reducing the incentive to work, these vouchers would
increase it. The students, schools, hospitals, and expecting mothers are given
an incentive to produce more in order to receive a benefit. A subsidy would
have created the opposite effect, inducing ineffectiveness in order to
preserve the right to receive the subsidy.
Developing redistributive incentive schemes is a task to which law and
economics scholars are uniquely able to contribute and have a tradition of
producing. 77 They are uniquely able to contribute because they focus on
incentives and how the legal system shapes them. The potential importance
of this contribution is massive. An example is visible if we contrast the
development of incentive schemes for educational goals suggested above
with the currently popular policy alternative, vouchers entitling parents to
private school tuition. As the proposed vouchers are only sufficient for
subsidized private schools, mostly religious, their effect on incentives would
be pernicious. Vouchers for alternative schools do nothing to improve the
schools' weakest and presumably easiest to improve students. Moreover,
instead of producing an incentive on the weakest students and their family to
increase their educational effort, vouchers remove the students and families
who do care about education from the educational community of the school,
leaving behind the weakest, and least attentive to education, students.
Finally, vouchers send to lower-spending schools students who may be able
to benefit from the greater spending of public schools. Schemes that would
provide educational incentives would avoid all these negative consequences
and improve the existing schools.
Three more ubiquitous examples of redistributive policies are legalized
abortion, the five-cent beverage container deposit laws and the
homeownership bias, all discussed above. 78 The list of redistributive non-tax
rules continues. John Lott shows that the benefits of permits for concealed
firearms accrue mostly to the weak.79 Ian Ayres and Steven Levitt notice
77. Redistributive rules that have been advanced by members of the Law and
Economics academy include the random installation of Lojack remote tracing units in
appliances that are at risk of theft, of "blind" political giving, and of the "shall issue"
concealed carry licenses. They are discussed briefly below, text accompanying notes 79-82.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
79. JoHN R. LoTr, MoRE Guls LEss CRmi (1998); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B.
Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1997); John R. Lott, Jr., Does Allowing Law-Abiding Citizens to Carry Concealed Handguns
Save Lives?, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 355, 361 (1997) (discussing the pronounced reduction of
crime against women); John R. Lott, Jr. & William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public
Shootings, Bombings, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private
[Vol. 33:279
SOLUTIONS TO DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS
that installations of Lojack units that help recover stolen cars, reduce car
theft. 80 Expanding on the same theme, they propose subsidized installation
of Lojack in property that is the target of crime. This proposal is
redistributive to the extent that the rich areas and houses can afford security
measures and avoid crime anyway. Moreover, the precaution of the rich
would tend to displace property crime to poor neighborhoods. A proposal for
anonymous political giving was expressly designed as a redistributive rule,
to reduce the political influence of the rich.81 In addition of the
redistributive effect of abortion discussed above, as John Donohue and
Steven Levitt show, the availability of abortion also reduced crime, 82
revealing one more redistributional effect. Families with skill, self-control,
and education avoid producing less desired and potentially criminal
offspring. The availability of abortion lets the lesser families share this
benefit. The redistributive effects of some of these rules could be replicated
by income taxes. Taxes would reduce incentives to work, while these rules
do not. Thus, some of these rules could be considered desirable even if their
only consequence were the non-monetary redistribution that they induce.
VI. CONCLUSION
Redistributing through taxation sacrifices growth. Redistributing
through the schemes analyzed in this essay does not. Moreover, general
taxes that only raise funds are "dumb" policy tools, providing no desirable
incentives compared to the design of redistributive rules, which produce
direct incentives for the redistributive goal. Even the ideal of optimal tax
theory is optimal insofar as it distorts the least: it induces the least reduction
of the incentive to produce and induces the least bias in favor of leisure.
Regimes of redistributive Coasean bargains and rules that induce directly the
redistributive goal, by contrast, induce "smart" redistribution in the same
sense that trading emission licenses induces "smart" environmental
protection compared to "command and control" environmental rules. The
incentives that redistributive rules produce can go directly to the
redistributive goal, such as educating inner city youth, providing preventive
and Public Law Enforcement, available at www.ssm.com (last visited April 12, 2002).
80. lan Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43 (1998).
81. Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
82. John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on
Crime, 116 Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001).
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medicine, or increasing basic research. Economic analysis of law can prove
invaluable by designing such redistributive incentive schemes. Compared to
optimal tax theory, redistribution by non-tax rules is superior because it
reaches where optimal taxation cannot. Redistributive rules improve the
welfare of the poor: they induce the recycling bottles and maintenance of
houses in poor neighborhoods, they make poor students and parents become
involved with their schools, they lead at-risk mothers to avoid risks.
Redistributive rules grow the pie that taxation, even if optimal, would
shrink.
